VPR-138 fix(cms): harden temp file path in DownloadZip

test/CMS/DownloadZipSecurityTests.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+using CmsData = Viper.Areas.CMS.Services.CmsFilePathSafety;
+
+namespace Viper.test.CMS;
+
+/// <summary>
+/// Security tests for the helpers that back <c>CMS.DownloadZip</c>.
+/// Covers the filename sanitizer used for the Content-Disposition header
+/// and the per-request temp-archive path builder (VPR-138).
+/// </summary>
+public sealed class DownloadZipSecurityTests
+{
+    #region SanitizeDownloadName
+
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData(@"\..\..\evil.zip")]
+    [InlineData("../../evil.zip")]
+    [InlineData(@"C:\Windows\Temp\evil.zip")]
+    [InlineData("../evil")]
+    public void SanitizeDownloadName_StripsPathSeparatorsAndTraversal(string input)
+    {
+        var result = CmsData.SanitizeDownloadName(input);
+
+        Assert.DoesNotContain('\\', result);
+        Assert.DoesNotContain('/', result);
+        Assert.DoesNotContain("..", result);
+        Assert.EndsWith(".zip", result, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+    }
+
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData(null)]
+    [InlineData("")]
+    [InlineData("   ")]
+    [InlineData("!!!")]
+    [InlineData("///")]
+    [InlineData(@"\\\")]
+    [InlineData(".")]
+    [InlineData("..")]
+    [InlineData("...")]
+    [InlineData(". .")]
+    public void SanitizeDownloadName_NullEmptyOrJunk_ReturnsDefault(string? input)
+    {
+        var result = CmsData.SanitizeDownloadName(input!);
+
+        Assert.Equal("FileDownload.zip", result);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void SanitizeDownloadName_NameWithoutExtension_AppendsZip()
+    {
+        var result = CmsData.SanitizeDownloadName("export");
+
+        Assert.Equal("export.zip", result);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void SanitizeDownloadName_NonZipExtension_ForcesZipSuffix()
+    {
+        // Documented choice: preserve the original name and append .zip so the
+        // response MIME (application/zip) always matches the filename.
+        var result = CmsData.SanitizeDownloadName("export.exe");
+
+        Assert.EndsWith(".zip", result, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+        Assert.Equal("export.exe.zip", result);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void SanitizeDownloadName_AlreadyZip_IsPreserved()
+    {
+        var result = CmsData.SanitizeDownloadName("monthly-report.zip");
+
+        Assert.Equal("monthly-report.zip", result);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void SanitizeDownloadName_CaseInsensitiveZipExtension_IsPreserved()
+    {
+        var result = CmsData.SanitizeDownloadName("REPORT.ZIP");
+
+        Assert.Equal("REPORT.ZIP", result);
+    }
+
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData("CON")]
+    [InlineData("PRN")]
+    [InlineData("AUX")]
+    [InlineData("NUL")]
+    [InlineData("COM1")]
+    [InlineData("LPT1")]
+    [InlineData("con")]
+    [InlineData("CON.txt")]
+    public void SanitizeDownloadName_ReservedWindowsDeviceNames_ReturnsDefault(string input)
+    {
+        var result = CmsData.SanitizeDownloadName(input);
+
+        Assert.Equal("FileDownload.zip", result);
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void SanitizeDownloadName_AllowsSafeCharacters()
+    {
+        var result = CmsData.SanitizeDownloadName("My_File-01 v2.zip");
+
+        Assert.Equal("My_File-01 v2.zip", result);
+    }
+
+    #endregion
+
+    #region Regression guard (VPR-138)
+
+    // Before the fix, DownloadZip built the on-disk temp archive path by
+    // concatenating GetRootFileFolder() + ticks + user-supplied fileName.
+    // A traversal payload in fileName (e.g. \..\..\evil.zip) escaped the
+    // CMS root. The fix splits the flow: user input feeds only the
+    // Content-Disposition name (SanitizeDownloadName); the on-disk path
+    // is generated from a server-side GUID under a dedicated temp root
+    // (BuildTempArchivePath).
+    //
+    // This test exercises both helpers as DownloadZip wires them and
+    // asserts the traversal payload cannot influence the on-disk path,
+    // even if a future refactor reintroduces the old concatenation.
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData(@"\..\..\evil.zip")]
+    [InlineData("../../evil.zip")]
+    [InlineData(@"C:\Windows\System32\evil.zip")]
+    [InlineData(@"..\..\..\..\Windows\evil.zip")]
+    [InlineData("../../../../etc/passwd")]
+    public void Regression_Vpr138_TraversalPayload_CannotEscapeTempRoot(string attackPayload)
+    {
+        var tempRoot = CreateIsolatedTempRoot();
+        try
+        {
+            var responseName = CmsData.SanitizeDownloadName(attackPayload);
+            var tempPath = CmsData.BuildTempArchivePath(tempRoot);
+
+            Assert.DoesNotContain('\\', responseName);
+            Assert.DoesNotContain('/', responseName);
+            Assert.DoesNotContain("..", responseName);
+            Assert.EndsWith(".zip", responseName, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+
+            var resolvedRoot = Path.GetFullPath(tempRoot);
+            var resolvedPath = Path.GetFullPath(tempPath);
+            Assert.StartsWith(
+                resolvedRoot + Path.DirectorySeparatorChar,
+                resolvedPath,
+                StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+            Assert.DoesNotContain("..", resolvedPath);
+        }
+        finally
+        {
+            Cleanup(tempRoot);
+        }
+    }
+
+    #endregion
+
+    #region SanitizeZipEntryName
+
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData(@"..\..\evil.txt", "evil.txt")]
+    [InlineData("../../evil.txt", "evil.txt")]
+    [InlineData(@"nested\folder\file.pdf", "file.pdf")]
+    [InlineData("nested/folder/file.pdf", "file.pdf")]
+    [InlineData("Annual Report 2024.pdf", "Annual Report 2024.pdf")]
+    public void SanitizeZipEntryName_StripsPathComponents(string friendlyName, string expected)
+    {
+        var result = CmsData.SanitizeZipEntryName(friendlyName, fallback: "fallback.bin");
+
+        Assert.Equal(expected, result);
+        Assert.DoesNotContain('\\', result);
+        Assert.DoesNotContain('/', result);
+    }
+
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData(null)]
+    [InlineData("")]
+    [InlineData("   ")]
+    public void SanitizeZipEntryName_EmptyFriendlyName_FallsBackToFilePath(string? friendlyName)
+    {
+        var result = CmsData.SanitizeZipEntryName(friendlyName!, fallback: @"C:\storage\real-file.bin");
+
+        Assert.Equal("real-file.bin", result);
+    }
+
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData("..")]
+    [InlineData(".")]
+    [InlineData("dir/..")]
+    [InlineData(@"nested\.")]
+    [InlineData(". .")]
+    public void SanitizeZipEntryName_DotsOnly_FallsBackToFilePath(string friendlyName)
+    {
+        var result = CmsData.SanitizeZipEntryName(friendlyName, fallback: @"C:\storage\real-file.bin");
+
+        Assert.Equal("real-file.bin", result);
+    }
+
+    #endregion
+
+    #region BuildTempArchivePath
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void BuildTempArchivePath_ReturnsPathUnderTempRoot()
+    {
+        var tempRoot = CreateIsolatedTempRoot();
+        try
+        {
+            var path = CmsData.BuildTempArchivePath(tempRoot);
+
+            var resolved = Path.GetFullPath(path);
+            var normalizedRoot = Path.GetFullPath(tempRoot);
+
+            Assert.StartsWith(
+                normalizedRoot + Path.DirectorySeparatorChar,
+                resolved,
+                StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+            Assert.EndsWith(".zip", resolved, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+        }
+        finally
+        {
+            Cleanup(tempRoot);
+        }
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void BuildTempArchivePath_AcceptsRootWithTrailingSeparator()
+    {
+        var tempRoot = CreateIsolatedTempRoot();
+        var withTrailing = tempRoot + Path.DirectorySeparatorChar;
+        try
+        {
+            var path = CmsData.BuildTempArchivePath(withTrailing);
+
+            var resolved = Path.GetFullPath(path);
+            var normalizedRoot = Path.TrimEndingDirectorySeparator(Path.GetFullPath(withTrailing));
+
+            Assert.StartsWith(
+                normalizedRoot + Path.DirectorySeparatorChar,
+                resolved,
+                StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
+        }
+        finally
+        {
+            Cleanup(tempRoot);
+        }
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void BuildTempArchivePath_GeneratesUniquePaths_OnSuccessiveCalls()
+    {
+        var tempRoot = CreateIsolatedTempRoot();
+        try
+        {
+            var a = CmsData.BuildTempArchivePath(tempRoot);
+            var b = CmsData.BuildTempArchivePath(tempRoot);
+
+            Assert.NotEqual(a, b);
+        }
+        finally
+        {
+            Cleanup(tempRoot);
+        }
+    }
+
+    [Theory]
+    [InlineData("")]
+    [InlineData("   ")]
+    public void BuildTempArchivePath_RejectsEmptyRoot(string tempRoot)
+    {
+        Assert.Throws<ArgumentException>(() => CmsData.BuildTempArchivePath(tempRoot));
+    }
+
+    [Fact]
+    public void BuildTempArchivePath_RejectsNullRoot()
+    {
+        Assert.Throws<ArgumentException>(() => CmsData.BuildTempArchivePath(null!));
+    }
+
+    #endregion
+
+    #region Helpers
+
+    private static string CreateIsolatedTempRoot()
+    {
+        var root = Path.Join(Path.GetTempPath(), "Viper-CMS-Test-" + Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N"));
+        Directory.CreateDirectory(root);
+        return root;
+    }
+
+    private static void Cleanup(string root)
+    {
+        if (Directory.Exists(root))
+        {
+            Directory.Delete(root, recursive: true);
+        }
+    }
+
+    #endregion
+}