What container tooling does in a Linux environment that presents uid 0 with a full capability set while refusing most of the kernel operations container runtimes are built on — and a design for a runtime that survives it without lying about what it provides.
| Path | Contents |
|---|---|
paper_final.md |
The paper. Every empirical claim is tagged verified, source-established, or reported-and-unreproducible. |
verification/ |
The harness that produces the verified claims. ./verification/run.sh |
references/ |
The earlier manuscripts and reviews this work reconciles, unmodified. |
The harness models the studied runtime as two mechanisms that can be switched on
independently — a user namespace with a partial ID map, and a seccomp filter — so
that each observed denial can be attributed to the one that actually causes it.
That separation is what settles the questions the earlier manuscripts disagreed
about. See verification/README.md.
./verification/run.sh # all sections
./verification/run.sh census bwrap podman # selected sectionsNeeds go, gcc, and a running docker; sections whose dependencies are missing
print SKIP. Captured output from the run the paper cites is in
verification/results/.