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chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.12.4 [security]#46
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renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability

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@renovate renovate bot commented Feb 20, 2026 •
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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
hono (source) 4.11.7 → 4.12.4 age confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

GHSA-gq3j-xvxp-8hrf

Summary

The basicAuth and bearerAuth middlewares previously used a comparison that was not fully timing-safe.

The timingSafeEqual function used normal string equality (===) when comparing hash values. This comparison may stop early if values differ, which can theoretically cause small timing differences.

The implementation has been updated to use a safer comparison method.

Details

The issue was caused by the use of normal string equality (===) when comparing hash values inside the timingSafeEqual function.

In JavaScript, string comparison may stop as soon as a difference is found. This means the comparison time can slightly vary depending on how many characters match.

Under very specific and controlled conditions, this behavior could theoretically allow timing-based analysis.

The implementation has been updated to:

  • Avoid early termination during comparison
  • Use a constant-time-style comparison method

Impact

This issue is unlikely to be exploited in normal environments.

It may only be relevant in highly controlled situations where precise timing measurements are possible.

This change is considered a security hardening improvement. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest version.

CVE-2026-29045

Summary

When using serveStatic together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. app.use('/admin/*', ...)), inconsistent URL decoding allowed protected static resources to be accessed without authorization.

The router used decodeURI, while serveStatic used decodeURIComponent. This mismatch allowed paths containing encoded slashes (%2F) to bypass middleware protections while still resolving to the intended filesystem path.

Details

The routing layer preserved %2F as a literal string, while serveStatic decoded it into / before resolving the file path.

Example:

Request: /admin%2Fsecret.html

  • Router sees: /admin%2Fsecret.html → does not match /admin/*
  • Static handler resolves: /admin/secret.html

As a result, static files under the configured static root could be served without triggering route-based protections.

This only affects applications that both:

  • Protect subpaths using route-based middleware, and
  • Serve files from the same static root using serveStatic.

This does not allow access outside the static root and is not a path traversal vulnerability.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker could bypass route-based authorization for protected static resources by supplying paths containing encoded slashes.

Applications relying solely on route-based middleware to protect static subpaths may have exposed those resources.

CVE-2026-29085

Summary

When using streamSSE() in Streaming Helper, the event, id, and retry fields were not validated for carriage return (\r) or newline (\n) characters.

Because the SSE protocol uses line breaks as field delimiters, this could allow injection of additional SSE fields within the same event frame if untrusted input was passed into these fields.

Details

The SSE helper builds event frames by joining lines with \n. While multi-line data: fields are handled according to the SSE specification, the event, id, and retry fields previously allowed raw values without rejecting embedded CR/LF characters.

Including CR/LF in these control fields could allow unintended additional fields (such as data:, id:, or retry:) to be injected into the event stream.

The issue has been fixed by rejecting CR/LF characters in these fields.

Impact

An attacker could manipulate the structure of SSE event frames if an application passed user-controlled input directly into event, id, or retry.

Depending on application behavior, this could result in injected SSE fields or altered event stream handling. Applications that render e.data in an unsafe manner (for example, using innerHTML) could potentially expose themselves to client-side script injection.

This issue affects applications that rely on the SSE helper to enforce protocol-level constraints.

CVE-2026-29086

Summary

The setCookie() utility did not validate semicolons (;), carriage returns (\r), or newline characters (\n) in the domain and path options when constructing the Set-Cookie header.

Because cookie attributes are delimited by semicolons, this could allow injection of additional cookie attributes if untrusted input was passed into these fields.

Details

setCookie() builds the Set-Cookie header by concatenating option values. While the cookie value itself is URL-encoded, the domain and path options were previously interpolated without rejecting unsafe characters.

Including ;, \r, or \n in these fields could result in unintended additional attributes (such as SameSite, Secure, Domain, or Path) being appended to the cookie header.

Modern runtimes prevent full header injection via CRLF, so this issue is limited to attribute-level manipulation within a single Set-Cookie header.

The issue has been fixed by rejecting these characters in the domain and path options.

Impact

An attacker may be able to manipulate cookie attributes if an application passes user-controlled input directly into the domain or path options of setCookie().

This could affect cookie scoping or security attributes depending on browser behavior. Exploitation requires application-level misuse of cookie options.

Hono added timing comparison hardening in basicAuth and bearerAuth

GHSA-gq3j-xvxp-8hrf

More information

Details

Summary

The basicAuth and bearerAuth middlewares previously used a comparison that was not fully timing-safe.

The timingSafeEqual function used normal string equality (===) when comparing hash values. This comparison may stop early if values differ, which can theoretically cause small timing differences.

The implementation has been updated to use a safer comparison method.

Details

The issue was caused by the use of normal string equality (===) when comparing hash values inside the timingSafeEqual function.

In JavaScript, string comparison may stop as soon as a difference is found. This means the comparison time can slightly vary depending on how many characters match.

Under very specific and controlled conditions, this behavior could theoretically allow timing-based analysis.

The implementation has been updated to:

  • Avoid early termination during comparison
  • Use a constant-time-style comparison method
Impact

This issue is unlikely to be exploited in normal environments.

It may only be relevant in highly controlled situations where precise timing measurements are possible.

This change is considered a security hardening improvement. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest version.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 3.7 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono Vulnerable to Cookie Attribute Injection via Unsanitized domain and path in setCookie()

CVE-2026-29086 / GHSA-5pq2-9x2x-5p6w

More information

Details

Summary

The setCookie() utility did not validate semicolons (;), carriage returns (\r), or newline characters (\n) in the domain and path options when constructing the Set-Cookie header.

Because cookie attributes are delimited by semicolons, this could allow injection of additional cookie attributes if untrusted input was passed into these fields.

Details

setCookie() builds the Set-Cookie header by concatenating option values. While the cookie value itself is URL-encoded, the domain and path options were previously interpolated without rejecting unsafe characters.

Including ;, \r, or \n in these fields could result in unintended additional attributes (such as SameSite, Secure, Domain, or Path) being appended to the cookie header.

Modern runtimes prevent full header injection via CRLF, so this issue is limited to attribute-level manipulation within a single Set-Cookie header.

The issue has been fixed by rejecting these characters in the domain and path options.

Impact

An attacker may be able to manipulate cookie attributes if an application passes user-controlled input directly into the domain or path options of setCookie().

This could affect cookie scoping or security attributes depending on browser behavior. Exploitation requires application-level misuse of cookie options.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.4 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono vulnerable to arbitrary file access via serveStatic vulnerability

CVE-2026-29045 / GHSA-q5qw-h33p-qvwr

More information

Details

Summary

When using serveStatic together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. app.use('/admin/*', ...)), inconsistent URL decoding allowed protected static resources to be accessed without authorization.

The router used decodeURI, while serveStatic used decodeURIComponent. This mismatch allowed paths containing encoded slashes (%2F) to bypass middleware protections while still resolving to the intended filesystem path.

Details

The routing layer preserved %2F as a literal string, while serveStatic decoded it into / before resolving the file path.

Example:

Request: /admin%2Fsecret.html

  • Router sees: /admin%2Fsecret.html → does not match /admin/*
  • Static handler resolves: /admin/secret.html

As a result, static files under the configured static root could be served without triggering route-based protections.

This only affects applications that both:

  • Protect subpaths using route-based middleware, and
  • Serve files from the same static root using serveStatic.

This does not allow access outside the static root and is not a path traversal vulnerability.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker could bypass route-based authorization for protected static resources by supplying paths containing encoded slashes.

Applications relying solely on route-based middleware to protect static subpaths may have exposed those resources.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Hono Vulnerable to SSE Control Field Injection via CR/LF in writeSSE()

CVE-2026-29085 / GHSA-p6xx-57qc-3wxr

More information

Details

Summary

When using streamSSE() in Streaming Helper, the event, id, and retry fields were not validated for carriage return (\r) or newline (\n) characters.

Because the SSE protocol uses line breaks as field delimiters, this could allow injection of additional SSE fields within the same event frame if untrusted input was passed into these fields.

Details

The SSE helper builds event frames by joining lines with \n. While multi-line data: fields are handled according to the SSE specification, the event, id, and retry fields previously allowed raw values without rejecting embedded CR/LF characters.

Including CR/LF in these control fields could allow unintended additional fields (such as data:, id:, or retry:) to be injected into the event stream.

The issue has been fixed by rejecting CR/LF characters in these fields.

Impact

An attacker could manipulate the structure of SSE event frames if an application passed user-controlled input directly into event, id, or retry.

Depending on application behavior, this could result in injected SSE fields or altered event stream handling. Applications that render e.data in an unsafe manner (for example, using innerHTML) could potentially expose themselves to client-side script injection.

This issue affects applications that rely on the SSE helper to enforce protocol-level constraints.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

honojs/hono (hono)

v4.12.4

Compare Source

v4.12.3

Compare Source

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.12.2...v4.12.3

v4.12.2

Compare Source

Security fix

Fixed incorrect handling of X-Forwarded-For in the AWS Lambda adapter behind ALB that could allow IP-based access control bypass. The detail: GHSA-xh87-mx6m-69f3

Thanks @​EdamAme-x

What's Changed

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.12.1...v4.12.2

v4.12.1

Compare Source

What's Changed

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.12.0...v4.12.1

v4.12.0

Compare Source

Release Notes

Hono v4.12.0 is now available!

This release includes new features for the Hono client, middleware improvements, adapter enhancements, and significant performance improvements to the router and context.

$path for Hono Client

The Hono client now has a $path() method that returns the path string instead of a full URL. This is useful when you need just the path portion for routing or key-based operations:

const client = hc<typeof app>('http://localhost:8787')

// Get the path string
const path = client.api.posts.$path()
// => '/api/posts'

// With path parameters
const postPath = client.api.posts[':id'].$path({
  param: { id: '123' },
})
// => '/api/posts/123'

// With query parameters
const searchPath = client.api.posts.$path({
  query: { filter: 'test' },
})
// => '/api/posts?filter=test'

Unlike $url() which returns a URL object, $path() returns a plain path string, making it convenient for use with routers or as cache keys.

Thanks @​ShaMan123!

ApplyGlobalResponse Type Helper for RPC Client

The new ApplyGlobalResponse type helper allows you to add global error response types to all routes in the RPC client. This is useful for typing common error responses from app.onError() or global middlewares:

const app = new Hono()
  .get('/api/users', (c) => c.json({ users: ['alice', 'bob'] }, 200))
  .onError((err, c) => c.json({ error: err.message }, 500))

type AppWithErrors = ApplyGlobalResponse<
  typeof app,
  {
    401: { json: { error: string; message: string } }
    500: { json: { error: string; message: string } }
  }
>

const client = hc<AppWithErrors>('http://api.example.com')
// Now client knows about both success and error responses
const res = await client.api.users.$get()
// InferResponseType includes { users: string[] } | { error: string; message: string }

Thanks @​mohankumarelec!

SSG Redirect Plugin

A new redirectPlugin for SSG generates static HTML redirect pages for HTTP redirect responses (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):

import { toSSG } from 'hono/ssg'
import { defaultPlugin, redirectPlugin } from 'hono/ssg'

const app = new Hono()
app.get('/old', (c) => c.redirect('/new'))
app.get('/new', (c) => c.html('New Page'))

// redirectPlugin must be placed before defaultPlugin
await toSSG(app, fs, {
  plugins: [redirectPlugin(), defaultPlugin()],
})

The generated redirect pages include a <meta http-equiv="refresh"> tag, a canonical link, and a robots noindex meta tag.

Thanks @​3w36zj6!

onAuthSuccess Callback for Basic Auth

The Basic Auth middleware now supports an onAuthSuccess callback that is invoked after successful authentication. This allows you to set context variables or perform logging without re-parsing the Authorization header:

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  basicAuth({
    username: 'hono',
    password: 'ahotproject',
    onAuthSuccess: (c, username) => {
      c.set('user', { name: username, role: 'admin' })
      console.log(`User ${username} authenticated`)
    },
  })
)

The callback also works with async functions and the verifyUser mode.

Thanks @​AprilNEA!

getConnInfo for AWS Lambda, Cloudflare Pages, and Netlify

getConnInfo() is now available for three additional adapters:

// AWS Lambda (supports API Gateway v1, v2, and ALB)
import { handle, getConnInfo } from 'hono/aws-lambda'

// Cloudflare Pages
import { handle, getConnInfo } from 'hono/cloudflare-pages'

// Netlify
import { handle, getConnInfo } from 'hono/netlify'

app.get('/', (c) => {
  const info = getConnInfo(c)
  return c.text(`Your IP: ${info.remote.address}`)
})

Thanks @​rokasta12!

alwaysRedirect Option for Trailing Slash Middleware

The trailing slash middleware now supports an alwaysRedirect option. When enabled, the middleware redirects before executing handlers, which fixes the issue where trailing slash handling doesn't work with wildcard routes:

app.use(trimTrailingSlash({ alwaysRedirect: true }))

app.get('/my-path/*', async (c) => {
  return c.text('wildcard')
})

// /my-path/something/ will be redirected to /my-path/something
// before the wildcard handler is executed

Progressive Locale Code Truncation

The normalizeLanguage function in the language middleware now supports RFC 4647 Lookup-based progressive truncation. Locale codes like ja-JP will match ja when only the base language is in supportedLanguages:

app.use(
  '/*',
  languageDetector({
    supportedLanguages: ['en', 'ja'],
    fallbackLanguage: 'en',
    order: ['cookie', 'header'],
  })
)

// Accept-Language: ja-JP → matches 'ja'
// Accept-Language: ko-KR → falls back to 'en'

Thanks @​sorafujitani!

exports Field for ExecutionContext

The ExecutionContext type now includes an exports property for Cloudflare Workers. You can use module augmentation to type it with Wrangler's generated types:

import 'hono'

declare module 'hono' {
  interface ExecutionContext {
    readonly exports: Cloudflare.Exports
  }
}

Thanks @​toreis-up!

Performance Improvements

TrieRouter 1.5x ~ 2.0x Faster

The TrieRouter has been significantly optimized with reduced spread syntax usage, O(1) hasChildren checks, lazy regular expression generation, and removal of redundant processes:

Route Node.js Deno Bun
short static GET /user 1.70x 1.40x 1.34x
dynamic GET /user/lookup/username/hey 1.38x 1.69x 1.51x
wildcard GET /static/index.html 1.51x 1.72x 1.43x
all together 1.58x 1.60x 1.82x

Thanks @​EdamAme-x!

Fast Path for c.json()

c.json() now has the same fast path optimization as c.text(). When no custom status, headers, or finalized state exists, the Response is created directly without allocating a Headers object:

// This common pattern is now faster
return c.json({ message: 'Hello' })

Benchmark results:

Metric Before After Change
Reqs/sec 92,268 95,244 +3.2%
Latency 5.42ms 5.25ms -3.1%
Throughput 17.24MB/s 19.07MB/s +10.6%

Thanks @​mgcrea!

New features

  • feat(client): Add ApplyGlobalResponse type helper for RPC Client #​4556
  • feat(ssg): add redirect plugin #​4599
  • feat(client): $path #​4636
  • feat(basic-auth): add context key and callback options #​4645
  • feat(adapter): add getConnInfo for AWS Lambda, Cloudflare Pages, and Netlify #​4649
  • feat(trailing-slash): add alwaysRedirect option to support wildcard routes #​4658
  • feat(language): add progressive locale code truncation to normalizeLanguage #​4717
  • feat(types): Add exports field to ExecutionContext #​4719

Performance

  • perf(context): add fast path to c.json() matching c.text() optimization #​4707
  • perf(trie-router): improve performance (1.5x ~ 2.0x) #​4724
  • perf(context): use createResponseInstance for new Response #​4733

All changes

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.10...v4.12.0

v4.11.10

Compare Source

What's Changed

  • fix: fixed to be more properly timing safe (Merge commit from fork 91def7c)

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.9...v4.11.10

v4.11.9

Compare Source

v4.11.8

Compare Source

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.7...v4.11.8

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" in timezone Europe/Copenhagen, Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@renovate renovate bot requested a review from luxass as a code owner February 20, 2026 20:39
@renovate renovate bot added the security label Feb 20, 2026
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socket-security bot commented Feb 20, 2026 •
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Review the following changes in direct dependencies. Learn more about Socket for GitHub.

Diff Package Supply Chain
Security		 Vulnerability Quality Maintenance License
Updatedhono@​4.11.7 ⏵ 4.12.499 +1100 +2097 +196100

View full report

@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability branch from 5ad4d5d to 76994e3 Compare March 4, 2026 22:37
@renovate renovate bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.11.10 [security] chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.12.4 [security] Mar 4, 2026
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