If you discover a security vulnerability in nbox, please report it responsibly:

1. Do not open a public GitHub issue
2. Email lance@lance0.com or use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting
3. Include steps to reproduce the issue
4. Allow reasonable time for a fix before public disclosure

Security issues of interest include:

• Leakage of the NetBox API token (in logs, error messages, or output)
• TLS verification bypass or weakening
• Memory-safety issues in API response parsing
• Any path that performs a write against NetBox (nbox is read-only)

• Tokens are never written to config. nbox resolves the API token in order: the env var named by the profile's token_env, then NBOX_TOKEN, then the OS keyring entry for the profile (nbox config token set, entered without echo). It is never persisted to config.toml and never logged — request logging shows only the auth-scheme marker, and the config's Debug output redacts secrets.
• Read-only. Every command and MCP tool only reads; nbox issues no writes (raw is GET-only). Use a read-scoped NetBox token for defense in depth.
• TLS verified by default. verify_tls = false is supported for labs with self-signed certs but must not be used against production.
• Clean stdout. Data goes to stdout; logs and errors go to stderr — safe for piping and for the nbox serve JSON-RPC stream.

nbox serve exposes the read-only tools to an MCP client. Its network surface:

• stdio by default — no network listener; the host launches nbox as a subprocess.
• HTTP is loopback-only unless OIDC is configured. nbox serve --http <addr> binds loopback and validates Origin/Host (a DNS-rebinding guard). An optional static bearer (--http-token / NBOX_SERVE_TOKEN — a secret; prefer the env var) gates /mcp.
• A routable deployment is an OAuth 2.1 resource server. A non-loopback bind requires --oidc-issuer + --audience: nbox validates inbound IdP JWTs on /mcp (signature via JWKS; iss/aud/exp checked; alg: none rejected) and advertises Protected Resource Metadata (RFC 9728). Terminate TLS in front (a reverse proxy).
• Accountability, not per-user RBAC. The last hop to NetBox still uses the single profile token, so scope that token read-only. An audit log (nbox::audit) records callers, and an optional per-caller rate limit (--rate-limit) bounds abuse.

See docs/MCP.md for the full security model.

Only the latest release receives security updates.