What casty holds, where it keeps it, and what each piece can do. casty has not been audited.
| Secret | Where it is | What it can do | How to take it back |
|---|---|---|---|
| Seed phrase | In memory while casty init or casty key revoke runs; never written to disk, never sent anywhere. With casty init --fid and a key added from the page by a wallet, casty never sees it at all |
Everything: it is the custody of your fid | casty cannot. Keep it offline |
| App key (Ed25519) | ~/.config/casty/keys.enc.json, encrypted with scrypt (N=2^17, r=8, p=1) and XChaCha20-Poly1305, mode 0600 |
Sign casts, reactions and follows for your fid (the --scopes given to init) until its TTL runs out unused (default 30 days, at most 90) |
casty key revoke <key> with the seed phrase, or --self with the key itself |
| Signed KEY_ADD not yet confirmed | Inside the same encrypted store, until a casty init sees the key listed or the node refuses the message |
Add that one key, once | casty key revoke if it ever merges |
| Key store passphrase | Typed at a hidden prompt. CASTY_PASSPHRASE exists for tests and pnpm demo |
Decrypt the app keys on this machine | Revoke the keys with the seed phrase, delete keys.enc.json, run casty init |
| casty web token | ~/.config/casty/web-token, mode 0600; in the paired browser's storage |
While casty web runs: read the feed and write as your app key, from wherever the page is reachable |
Stop casty web, then start it with --new-token |
The same on the node's host (1-node.sh serve) |
~/snapchain/casty/config/keys.enc.json (0600), the passphrase in ~/snapchain/casty/passphrase (0600, a Docker secret), the token in ~/snapchain/casty/config/web-token; the key decrypted in the service's memory |
Read and write as you from any network while the service runs; root on the host has the key | casty key revoke <key> with the seed phrase; docker compose stop casty on the host; --read-only keeps the key at home |
Push key pair and subscriptions (casty serve) |
~/snapchain/casty/config/vapid.json (0600) and cache/push.json on the host |
Send a push, "new mention from @name", to the subscribed browsers; the push service sees only ciphertext | Delete both files and restart casty; turn notifications off in the browser |
Cloud token (HCLOUD_TOKEN, AWS credentials) |
Your environment; the scripts never write it | Create and delete servers in that project | Revoke it in the provider's console |
| SSH key | Yours (~/.ssh/id_ed25519 unless --ssh-pubkey); only the public half is uploaded |
Root on the node host | Remove it from the host and the provider |
- The provider firewall opens SSH (22) and the node's HTTP (3381) and gRPC (3383) ports to
--allow-iponly, your address by default; gossip (3382) is open to everyone so peers can connect. An existing host gets no firewall from casty. - statsd (8125/udp, 8126/tcp) and Grafana (3000) are bound to the host's loopback, on any host
1-node.shruns on: it sets the compose file's ownSTATSD_PUBLISHandSTATSD_ADMIN_PUBLISHin.env. Grafana'sadminpassword is the random one.envrecords asGRAFANA_PASSWORD, not the default; reach it over SSH. - casty reaches the node through the SSH tunnel at
127.0.0.1:3381. It calls no hosted Farcaster API. The fname registry is asked only for a name the node cannot resolve: an@nameyou follow or mention in a cast (--no-allow-fname-serverturns that off), read withfeed --fidsor look up incasty web, and the author of a cast you name by its farcaster.xyz link, and an OP Mainnet RPC only when you pass--op-rpc. casty weblistens on 127.0.0.1:3390 unless--listennames another address. Every API call needs its token; writes are JSON only, a Host that is not an IP address,localhostor the--listenhost is refused, and the page runs only its own script and loads nothing from other sites. With--listen 0.0.0.0:3390the page and its token travel over plain HTTP on that network. While it runs, the app key is decrypted in memory.1-node.sh serve --domainopens the page to the internet over HTTPS (80 and 443, opened with0-provision.sh --https);--tailscaleonly to your tailnet. The page then needs its token, sends HSTS, and answers one address at most 120 API requests a minute.- With notifications on,
casty servesends the browser's push service (Apple's, Google's or Mozilla's) one encrypted message per mention or reply: the sender's name, never the cast's text. Besides the fname registry above, the only request casty makes to a third party, and only for browsers that asked. - Cast text from other people has terminal control characters removed before it is printed, and enters the web page only as text.
- App key:
casty key revoke <key> --selffrom any machine that still has it, or with the seed phrase from anywhere;casty key listshows what is registered. - Seed phrase: move the fid to a new custody address with a wallet you trust, then revoke every app key.
- Cloud token: revoke it, then check the project for servers you did not create.
- casty web token: stop
casty web, then start it with--new-token; links printed before stop working. On the node's host: delete~/snapchain/casty/config/web-tokenanddocker compose restart casty. - The node's host: revoke the app key with the seed phrase, delete
~/snapchain/casty, and treat the host as compromised for the node too.
Report vulnerabilities privately (on GitHub: Security, then "Report a vulnerability"), not in a public issue.