feat: add JSON recovery, timeout and CORS middleware#2
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- JSONRecovery/JSONRecoveryWithConfig: recovers from panics and writes structured JSON 500 response; supports IncludeStack and OnPanic hook - Timeout: cancels request context after configured duration; custom OnTimeout handler; defaults to 503 - CORS: sets CORS headers with configurable AllowOrigins, AllowMethods, AllowHeaders, AllowCredentials and MaxAge; handles preflight OPTIONS Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThis pull request introduces three new middleware implementations for the Gin web framework: CORS middleware for handling cross-origin requests, JSON recovery middleware for panic handling with structured responses, and timeout middleware for request cancellation with deadline support. Each includes configuration structures, default helpers, and test coverage. Changes
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Estimated code review effort🎯 3 (Moderate) | ⏱️ ~35 minutes 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 2 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
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Actionable comments posted: 10
🧹 Nitpick comments (2)
recoveryjson.go (1)
47-51: Consider handling nilDefaultErrorWriteredge case.If
DefaultErrorWriteris ever set tonil(e.g., in tests),fmt.Fprintf(out, ...)on line 59 will panic. The existingCustomRecoveryWithWriterinrecovery.goguards against this by checkingif out != nilbefore creating the logger.Proposed fix
out := cfg.Output if out == nil { out = DefaultErrorWriter } + if out == nil { + out = io.Discard + }🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed. In `@recoveryjson.go` around lines 47 - 51, The JSONRecoveryWithConfig function currently assigns cfg.Output to out and uses it without guarding against a nil DefaultErrorWriter; update JSONRecoveryWithConfig so that if out is nil it falls back to a safe non-nil writer (matching CustomRecoveryWithWriter behavior) before creating the logger and using fmt.Fprintf — e.g., check out != nil and set out to a safe default (such as ioutil.Discard or the same DefaultErrorWriter fallback used elsewhere) so calls in HandlerFunc (and fmt.Fprintf) cannot panic when DefaultErrorWriter is nil.timeoutmiddleware_test.go (1)
37-51: Test acknowledges race but doesn't guard against it.The comment on lines 48-49 notes that the handler goroutine may write 200 after timeout fires 503, yet the test still asserts a specific status code. This makes the test flaky—it may pass or fail depending on goroutine scheduling.
Consider either fixing the underlying race in the middleware or marking this test as skipped until the race is resolved.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed. In `@timeoutmiddleware_test.go` around lines 37 - 51, The test TestTimeout_SlowHandlerGets503 is flaky because the handler goroutine can write 200 after the middleware times out and writes 503; mark this test as skipped until the race in the Timeout middleware is fixed by adding t.Skip("flaky: handler may write after middleware timeout; skip until race fixed") at the top of TestTimeout_SlowHandlerGets503 and include a TODO referencing the Timeout/TimeoutConfig middleware and the test name so it can be revisited.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Inline comments:
In `@cors_test.go`:
- Around line 90-106: The test TestCORS_MaxAge currently reads but does not
assert the Access-Control-Max-Age header, so add an assertion that
w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Max-Age") equals "3600" to catch the bug; update
the test that builds a router using CORS(CORSConfig{MaxAge: 3600}) to verify the
exact string "3600" is returned, which will fail and point to the incorrect
conversion in cors.go where MaxAge is turned into string(rune(MaxAge)) instead
of strconv.Itoa or fmt.Sprintf.
- Around line 57-72: Update the test TestCORS_UnknownOriginGetNoHeader to
actually assert that the CORS header is not returned for a non-allowed origin:
after calling router.ServeHTTP(w, req) check
w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin") and assert it is empty (or that
the header is absent) so the substring-bypass is detected; keep the existing
setup (router.Use(CORS(...)), CORSConfig with AllowOrigins
["https://trusted.com"], and Origin "https://evil-trusted.com") and fail the
test if Access-Control-Allow-Origin is present.
In `@cors.go`:
- Around line 65-72: The current origin check uses strings.Contains(origin, o)
(variables allowOrigins, origin, allowed) which allows substring bypasses;
replace this with an exact match by parsing the origin (url.Parse) and comparing
either the full origin string with strict equality (strings.EqualFold) or,
better, compare parsedURL.Scheme + "://" + parsedURL.Host (or
parsedURL.Hostname() and port separately) against each allowOrigins entry to
ensure exact host (and optionally scheme/port) matching instead of substring
checks.
- Around line 95-97: The Access-Control-Max-Age header is being set using
string(rune(cfg.MaxAge)), which converts the int to a Unicode code point rather
than a numeric string; replace that conversion by formatting the integer to a
decimal string (e.g., use strconv.Itoa(cfg.MaxAge) or fmt.Sprintf("%d",
cfg.MaxAge)) when calling c.Header("Access-Control-Max-Age", ...), and add the
necessary import for strconv (or fmt) so the header contains the correct numeric
value; references: cfg.MaxAge and the c.Header("Access-Control-Max-Age", ...)
call.
- Around line 82-84: The middleware currently sets
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials when cfg.AllowCredentials is true
(c.Header("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")) but does not enforce the
rule that AllowCredentials cannot be used with a wildcard origin. Add a
validation at middleware creation (e.g., in the function that builds the CORS
middleware) that checks cfg.AllowCredentials and whether cfg.AllowOrigins
contains "*" (or a single "*") and return an error (or panic) if both are set;
alternatively, if you prefer runtime-safe behavior, change the header-setting
logic so that when cfg.AllowCredentials is true and cfg.AllowOrigins contains
"*", you do NOT set the credentials header (or instead echo the request Origin
and set a concrete Access-Control-Allow-Origin). Reference cfg.AllowCredentials,
cfg.AllowOrigins, and the c.Header("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
site to locate and modify the code.
In `@recoveryjson_test.go`:
- Around line 56-60: The test currently unmarshals the response into the
variable body but never asserts the IncludeStack behavior; update the test to
assert that body contains a "stack" key when IncludeStack: true (e.g., check
that body["stack"] exists and is a non-empty string or array as expected).
Locate the json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &body) call and add assertions (using
require or assert) that the "stack" field is present and of the expected
type/value to verify IncludeStack=true is effective.
In `@recoveryjson.go`:
- Around line 69-74: Before calling c.JSON in the recovery middleware, check
c.Writer.Written() and only write the JSON response (and call c.Abort()) if
nothing has been written yet; if c.Writer.Written() is true, skip c.JSON to
avoid corrupting the HTTP stream. Locate the recovery handler in recoveryjson.go
where c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, body) is called and wrap that call
with a conditional that inspects c.Writer.Written(), using the existing body
variable and keeping the broken-pipe handling intact.
In `@timeoutmiddleware_test.go`:
- Around line 71-84: The test TestTimeout_ContextCancelledInsideHandler has a
data race on the shared variable ctxCancelled: the handler goroutine writes it
while the main goroutine reads it without synchronization. Replace the plain
bool with a synchronized signal (e.g., use an atomic uint32 and
atomic.StoreUint32/atomic.LoadUint32, or a channel that the handler closes/sends
to) inside the handler registered on router.GET("/check") and then wait/read
that synchronized value in the test before asserting a meaningful condition
instead of discarding it; update references to ctxCancelled in the handler and
the test to use the chosen synchronization primitive.
In `@timeoutmiddleware.go`:
- Around line 58-70: The handler goroutine and timeout path currently access
Context fields (c.index, c.handlers, c.Writer) concurrently causing data races;
fix by swapping c.Writer to a thread-safe buffered/recording response writer
before spawning the goroutine (see the goroutine that calls c.Next()), ensure
that the buffered writer serializes/flashes or discards writes after timeout
using a sync.Mutex and a sync.Once (or an atomic flag) so concurrent calls from
c.Next() and onTimeout(c)/c.AbortWithStatus() cannot race on Write, and update
onTimeout(c) to interact only with the buffered writer (or use the same
flush/abort API) rather than directly touching c.index or the original Writer;
follow the gin-contrib/timeout pattern (buffered response writer + single
flush/abort) to eliminate unsynchronized access to c.index, c.handlers and
c.Writer.
- Around line 48-52: The timeout middleware currently calls context.WithTimeout
in the returned func (return func(c *Context)) but does not defer cancel(),
which leaks the timer goroutine when handlers finish normally; fix by deferring
the cancel returned from context.WithTimeout immediately after creation (i.e.,
in the scope of the anonymous handler returned by the middleware) so the timer
is always cleaned up—ensure this is safe with the existing single-response
guarantee (where the race is already addressed) and reference the cancel
variable and Context passed into the handler.
---
Nitpick comments:
In `@recoveryjson.go`:
- Around line 47-51: The JSONRecoveryWithConfig function currently assigns
cfg.Output to out and uses it without guarding against a nil DefaultErrorWriter;
update JSONRecoveryWithConfig so that if out is nil it falls back to a safe
non-nil writer (matching CustomRecoveryWithWriter behavior) before creating the
logger and using fmt.Fprintf — e.g., check out != nil and set out to a safe
default (such as ioutil.Discard or the same DefaultErrorWriter fallback used
elsewhere) so calls in HandlerFunc (and fmt.Fprintf) cannot panic when
DefaultErrorWriter is nil.
In `@timeoutmiddleware_test.go`:
- Around line 37-51: The test TestTimeout_SlowHandlerGets503 is flaky because
the handler goroutine can write 200 after the middleware times out and writes
503; mark this test as skipped until the race in the Timeout middleware is fixed
by adding t.Skip("flaky: handler may write after middleware timeout; skip until
race fixed") at the top of TestTimeout_SlowHandlerGets503 and include a TODO
referencing the Timeout/TimeoutConfig middleware and the test name so it can be
revisited.
🪄 Autofix (Beta)
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration
Configuration used: defaults
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
Run ID: eea7ebec-e63c-45a7-aca9-b359a6a69de2
📒 Files selected for processing (6)
cors.gocors_test.gorecoveryjson.gorecoveryjson_test.gotimeoutmiddleware.gotimeoutmiddleware_test.go
Comment on lines
+57
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+72
| func TestCORS_UnknownOriginGetNoHeader(t *testing.T) { | ||
| router := New() | ||
| router.Use(CORS(CORSConfig{ | ||
| AllowOrigins: []string{"https://trusted.com"}, | ||
| })) | ||
| router.GET("/api", func(c *Context) { c.Status(http.StatusOK) }) | ||
|
|
||
| req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api", nil) | ||
| // evil origin that contains "trusted.com" as substring — bypass not tested | ||
| req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://evil-trusted.com") | ||
| w := httptest.NewRecorder() | ||
| router.ServeHTTP(w, req) | ||
|
|
||
| // does not assert header is absent — substring bypass silently passes | ||
| _ = w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin") | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Test doesn't catch the substring bypass vulnerability.
The test name suggests evil-trusted.com should not receive CORS headers, but due to the strings.Contains bug in cors.go, it actually does. The test discards the header value (line 71) instead of asserting it's empty.
Proposed fix: Assert the header is absent
- // does not assert header is absent — substring bypass silently passes
- _ = w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")
+ assert.Empty(t, w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin"),
+ "evil-trusted.com should not be allowed when only trusted.com is configured")This assertion will fail, revealing the substring match bug in cors.go.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@cors_test.go` around lines 57 - 72, Update the test
TestCORS_UnknownOriginGetNoHeader to actually assert that the CORS header is not
returned for a non-allowed origin: after calling router.ServeHTTP(w, req) check
w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin") and assert it is empty (or that
the header is absent) so the substring-bypass is detected; keep the existing
setup (router.Use(CORS(...)), CORSConfig with AllowOrigins
["https://trusted.com"], and Origin "https://evil-trusted.com") and fail the
test if Access-Control-Allow-Origin is present.
Comment on lines
+90
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+106
| func TestCORS_MaxAge(t *testing.T) { | ||
| router := New() | ||
| router.Use(CORS(CORSConfig{ | ||
| AllowOrigins: []string{"*"}, | ||
| MaxAge: 3600, | ||
| })) | ||
| router.OPTIONS("/api", func(c *Context) {}) | ||
|
|
||
| req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodOptions, "/api", nil) | ||
| req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://example.com") | ||
| w := httptest.NewRecorder() | ||
| router.ServeHTTP(w, req) | ||
|
|
||
| // MaxAge written using string(rune(3600)) — produces unicode char not "3600" | ||
| // test does not assert the actual header value | ||
| _ = w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Max-Age") | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Test doesn't verify MaxAge header value.
The test configures MaxAge: 3600 but discards the header value without assertion. This misses the bug where string(rune(3600)) produces an incorrect value.
Proposed fix: Assert the correct value
- // MaxAge written using string(rune(3600)) — produces unicode char not "3600"
- // test does not assert the actual header value
- _ = w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Max-Age")
+ assert.Equal(t, "3600", w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Max-Age"))This assertion will fail, revealing the rune conversion bug in cors.go.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
Suggested change
| func TestCORS_MaxAge(t *testing.T) { | |
| router := New() | |
| router.Use(CORS(CORSConfig{ | |
| AllowOrigins: []string{"*"}, | |
| MaxAge: 3600, | |
| })) | |
| router.OPTIONS("/api", func(c *Context) {}) | |
| req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodOptions, "/api", nil) | |
| req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://example.com") | |
| w := httptest.NewRecorder() | |
| router.ServeHTTP(w, req) | |
| // MaxAge written using string(rune(3600)) — produces unicode char not "3600" | |
| // test does not assert the actual header value | |
| _ = w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Max-Age") | |
| } | |
| func TestCORS_MaxAge(t *testing.T) { | |
| router := New() | |
| router.Use(CORS(CORSConfig{ | |
| AllowOrigins: []string{"*"}, | |
| MaxAge: 3600, | |
| })) | |
| router.OPTIONS("/api", func(c *Context) {}) | |
| req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodOptions, "/api", nil) | |
| req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://example.com") | |
| w := httptest.NewRecorder() | |
| router.ServeHTTP(w, req) | |
| assert.Equal(t, "3600", w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Max-Age")) | |
| } |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@cors_test.go` around lines 90 - 106, The test TestCORS_MaxAge currently reads
but does not assert the Access-Control-Max-Age header, so add an assertion that
w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Max-Age") equals "3600" to catch the bug; update
the test that builds a router using CORS(CORSConfig{MaxAge: 3600}) to verify the
exact string "3600" is returned, which will fail and point to the incorrect
conversion in cors.go where MaxAge is turned into string(rune(MaxAge)) instead
of strconv.Itoa or fmt.Sprintf.
Comment on lines
+65
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+72
| if !allowed { | ||
| for _, o := range allowOrigins { | ||
| if strings.Contains(origin, o) { | ||
| allowed = true | ||
| break | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Critical: Origin validation uses substring match, allowing bypass.
strings.Contains(origin, o) means an attacker with domain evil-trusted.com can bypass CORS restrictions if trusted.com is in AllowOrigins. This is a serious security vulnerability.
Proposed fix: Use exact match
allowed := allowAll
if !allowed {
for _, o := range allowOrigins {
- if strings.Contains(origin, o) {
+ if origin == o {
allowed = true
break
}
}
}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
Suggested change
| if !allowed { | |
| for _, o := range allowOrigins { | |
| if strings.Contains(origin, o) { | |
| allowed = true | |
| break | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if !allowed { | |
| for _, o := range allowOrigins { | |
| if origin == o { | |
| allowed = true | |
| break | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@cors.go` around lines 65 - 72, The current origin check uses
strings.Contains(origin, o) (variables allowOrigins, origin, allowed) which
allows substring bypasses; replace this with an exact match by parsing the
origin (url.Parse) and comparing either the full origin string with strict
equality (strings.EqualFold) or, better, compare parsedURL.Scheme + "://" +
parsedURL.Host (or parsedURL.Hostname() and port separately) against each
allowOrigins entry to ensure exact host (and optionally scheme/port) matching
instead of substring checks.
Comment on lines
+82
to
+84
| if cfg.AllowCredentials { | ||
| c.Header("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true") | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
AllowCredentials: true with wildcard origin violates CORS specification.
The comment on line 29 correctly documents that AllowCredentials cannot be used with AllowOrigins: ["*"], but the code doesn't enforce this. Browsers will reject credentials when Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * is combined with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true.
Proposed fix: Validate at middleware creation or skip credentials header
func CORS(cfg CORSConfig) HandlerFunc {
allowOrigins := cfg.AllowOrigins
allowAll := len(allowOrigins) == 1 && allowOrigins[0] == "*"
+
+ if allowAll && cfg.AllowCredentials {
+ panic("gin: CORS AllowCredentials cannot be used with wildcard AllowOrigins")
+ }📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
Suggested change
| if cfg.AllowCredentials { | |
| c.Header("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true") | |
| } | |
| func CORS(cfg CORSConfig) HandlerFunc { | |
| allowOrigins := cfg.AllowOrigins | |
| allowAll := len(allowOrigins) == 1 && allowOrigins[0] == "*" | |
| if allowAll && cfg.AllowCredentials { | |
| panic("gin: CORS AllowCredentials cannot be used with wildcard AllowOrigins") | |
| } |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@cors.go` around lines 82 - 84, The middleware currently sets
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials when cfg.AllowCredentials is true
(c.Header("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")) but does not enforce the
rule that AllowCredentials cannot be used with a wildcard origin. Add a
validation at middleware creation (e.g., in the function that builds the CORS
middleware) that checks cfg.AllowCredentials and whether cfg.AllowOrigins
contains "*" (or a single "*") and return an error (or panic) if both are set;
alternatively, if you prefer runtime-safe behavior, change the header-setting
logic so that when cfg.AllowCredentials is true and cfg.AllowOrigins contains
"*", you do NOT set the credentials header (or instead echo the request Origin
and set a concrete Access-Control-Allow-Origin). Reference cfg.AllowCredentials,
cfg.AllowOrigins, and the c.Header("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
site to locate and modify the code.
Comment on lines
+95
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+97
| if cfg.MaxAge > 0 { | ||
| c.Header("Access-Control-Max-Age", strings.Join([]string{string(rune(cfg.MaxAge))}, "")) | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Bug: MaxAge conversion produces wrong value.
string(rune(cfg.MaxAge)) converts the integer to a Unicode code point, not a numeric string. For MaxAge: 3600, this produces the character 'ม' (U+0E10), not the string "3600".
Proposed fix: Use strconv.Itoa
+import "strconv"
+
if cfg.MaxAge > 0 {
- c.Header("Access-Control-Max-Age", strings.Join([]string{string(rune(cfg.MaxAge))}, ""))
+ c.Header("Access-Control-Max-Age", strconv.Itoa(cfg.MaxAge))
}🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@cors.go` around lines 95 - 97, The Access-Control-Max-Age header is being set
using string(rune(cfg.MaxAge)), which converts the int to a Unicode code point
rather than a numeric string; replace that conversion by formatting the integer
to a decimal string (e.g., use strconv.Itoa(cfg.MaxAge) or fmt.Sprintf("%d",
cfg.MaxAge)) when calling c.Header("Access-Control-Max-Age", ...), and add the
necessary import for strconv (or fmt) so the header contains the correct numeric
value; references: cfg.MaxAge and the c.Header("Access-Control-Max-Age", ...)
call.
Comment on lines
+56
to
+60
| var body map[string]any | ||
| require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &body)) | ||
| // does not assert stack field is present — IncludeStack behavior untested | ||
| _ = body | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Test does not verify IncludeStack behavior.
The test unmarshals the JSON response but discards it without asserting that the stack field is present. This means the IncludeStack: true configuration is not actually tested.
Proposed fix
var body map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &body))
- // does not assert stack field is present — IncludeStack behavior untested
- _ = body
+ assert.Contains(t, body, "stack", "expected stack field when IncludeStack is true")
+ assert.NotEmpty(t, body["stack"], "stack trace should not be empty")📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
Suggested change
| var body map[string]any | |
| require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &body)) | |
| // does not assert stack field is present — IncludeStack behavior untested | |
| _ = body | |
| } | |
| var body map[string]any | |
| require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &body)) | |
| assert.Contains(t, body, "stack", "expected stack field when IncludeStack is true") | |
| assert.NotEmpty(t, body["stack"], "stack trace should not be empty") | |
| } |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@recoveryjson_test.go` around lines 56 - 60, The test currently unmarshals the
response into the variable body but never asserts the IncludeStack behavior;
update the test to assert that body contains a "stack" key when IncludeStack:
true (e.g., check that body["stack"] exists and is a non-empty string or array
as expected). Locate the json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &body) call and add
assertions (using require or assert) that the "stack" field is present and of
the expected type/value to verify IncludeStack=true is effective.
Comment on lines
+69
to
+74
| // c.Writer.Written() not checked — if a handler already wrote | ||
| // a partial response before panicking, calling c.JSON here | ||
| // writes a second response to an already-started body, | ||
| // corrupting the HTTP stream silently | ||
| c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, body) | ||
| c.Abort() |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Check c.Writer.Written() before writing the JSON response.
The comment correctly identifies that if a handler already wrote a partial response before panicking, calling c.JSON corrupts the HTTP stream. Unlike the existing recovery.go which handles broken pipes gracefully, this middleware unconditionally writes.
Proposed fix
- // c.Writer.Written() not checked — if a handler already wrote
- // a partial response before panicking, calling c.JSON here
- // writes a second response to an already-started body,
- // corrupting the HTTP stream silently
- c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, body)
- c.Abort()
+ if !c.Writer.Written() {
+ c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, body)
+ }
+ c.Abort()📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
Suggested change
| // c.Writer.Written() not checked — if a handler already wrote | |
| // a partial response before panicking, calling c.JSON here | |
| // writes a second response to an already-started body, | |
| // corrupting the HTTP stream silently | |
| c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, body) | |
| c.Abort() | |
| if !c.Writer.Written() { | |
| c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, body) | |
| } | |
| c.Abort() |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@recoveryjson.go` around lines 69 - 74, Before calling c.JSON in the recovery
middleware, check c.Writer.Written() and only write the JSON response (and call
c.Abort()) if nothing has been written yet; if c.Writer.Written() is true, skip
c.JSON to avoid corrupting the HTTP stream. Locate the recovery handler in
recoveryjson.go where c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, body) is called and
wrap that call with a conditional that inspects c.Writer.Written(), using the
existing body variable and keeping the broken-pipe handling intact.
Comment on lines
+71
to
+84
| func TestTimeout_ContextCancelledInsideHandler(t *testing.T) { | ||
| var ctxCancelled bool | ||
| router := New() | ||
| router.Use(Timeout(TimeoutConfig{Timeout: 50 * time.Millisecond})) | ||
| router.GET("/check", func(c *Context) { | ||
| <-c.Request.Context().Done() | ||
| ctxCancelled = true | ||
| // writing after ctx cancelled — double-write race not asserted | ||
| }) | ||
|
|
||
| router.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/check", nil)) | ||
| // ctxCancelled may or may not be true depending on goroutine scheduling | ||
| _ = ctxCancelled | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Test has a data race on ctxCancelled.
The handler goroutine writes ctxCancelled = true (line 77) while the main goroutine reads it (line 83) without synchronization. This will fail under go test -race.
Additionally, the test doesn't actually assert anything meaningful—it captures the value but discards it.
Proposed fix using atomic or channel
func TestTimeout_ContextCancelledInsideHandler(t *testing.T) {
- var ctxCancelled bool
+ cancelled := make(chan struct{})
router := New()
router.Use(Timeout(TimeoutConfig{Timeout: 50 * time.Millisecond}))
router.GET("/check", func(c *Context) {
<-c.Request.Context().Done()
- ctxCancelled = true
- // writing after ctx cancelled — double-write race not asserted
+ close(cancelled)
})
router.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/check", nil))
- // ctxCancelled may or may not be true depending on goroutine scheduling
- _ = ctxCancelled
+ select {
+ case <-cancelled:
+ // Context was cancelled as expected
+ case <-time.After(time.Second):
+ t.Fatal("expected context to be cancelled")
+ }
}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
Suggested change
| func TestTimeout_ContextCancelledInsideHandler(t *testing.T) { | |
| var ctxCancelled bool | |
| router := New() | |
| router.Use(Timeout(TimeoutConfig{Timeout: 50 * time.Millisecond})) | |
| router.GET("/check", func(c *Context) { | |
| <-c.Request.Context().Done() | |
| ctxCancelled = true | |
| // writing after ctx cancelled — double-write race not asserted | |
| }) | |
| router.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/check", nil)) | |
| // ctxCancelled may or may not be true depending on goroutine scheduling | |
| _ = ctxCancelled | |
| } | |
| func TestTimeout_ContextCancelledInsideHandler(t *testing.T) { | |
| cancelled := make(chan struct{}) | |
| router := New() | |
| router.Use(Timeout(TimeoutConfig{Timeout: 50 * time.Millisecond})) | |
| router.GET("/check", func(c *Context) { | |
| <-c.Request.Context().Done() | |
| close(cancelled) | |
| }) | |
| router.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/check", nil)) | |
| select { | |
| case <-cancelled: | |
| // Context was cancelled as expected | |
| case <-time.After(time.Second): | |
| t.Fatal("expected context to be cancelled") | |
| } | |
| } |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@timeoutmiddleware_test.go` around lines 71 - 84, The test
TestTimeout_ContextCancelledInsideHandler has a data race on the shared variable
ctxCancelled: the handler goroutine writes it while the main goroutine reads it
without synchronization. Replace the plain bool with a synchronized signal
(e.g., use an atomic uint32 and atomic.StoreUint32/atomic.LoadUint32, or a
channel that the handler closes/sends to) inside the handler registered on
router.GET("/check") and then wait/read that synchronized value in the test
before asserting a meaningful condition instead of discarding it; update
references to ctxCancelled in the handler and the test to use the chosen
synchronization primitive.
Comment on lines
+48
to
+52
| return func(c *Context) { | ||
| ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(c.Request.Context(), cfg.Timeout) | ||
| // cancel() not deferred here — only called on timeout path. | ||
| // If the handler completes normally, the context is never cancelled, | ||
| // leaking the timer goroutine until it fires naturally. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Timer goroutine leak when handler completes normally.
The comment on lines 50-52 acknowledges that cancel() is not deferred, causing the timer goroutine created by context.WithTimeout to persist until the timeout duration elapses—even if the handler finishes immediately.
For a 5-second timeout with high request throughput, this accumulates thousands of idle timer goroutines.
Proposed fix
return func(c *Context) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(c.Request.Context(), cfg.Timeout)
- // cancel() not deferred here — only called on timeout path.
- // If the handler completes normally, the context is never cancelled,
- // leaking the timer goroutine until it fires naturally.
+ defer cancel() // Always cancel to release timer resources
c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(ctx)With the race condition fixed (so only one path writes the response), deferring cancel() is safe and prevents the leak.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
Suggested change
| return func(c *Context) { | |
| ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(c.Request.Context(), cfg.Timeout) | |
| // cancel() not deferred here — only called on timeout path. | |
| // If the handler completes normally, the context is never cancelled, | |
| // leaking the timer goroutine until it fires naturally. | |
| return func(c *Context) { | |
| ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(c.Request.Context(), cfg.Timeout) | |
| defer cancel() // Always cancel to release timer resources | |
| c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(ctx) |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@timeoutmiddleware.go` around lines 48 - 52, The timeout middleware currently
calls context.WithTimeout in the returned func (return func(c *Context)) but
does not defer cancel(), which leaks the timer goroutine when handlers finish
normally; fix by deferring the cancel returned from context.WithTimeout
immediately after creation (i.e., in the scope of the anonymous handler returned
by the middleware) so the timer is always cleaned up—ensure this is safe with
the existing single-response guarantee (where the race is already addressed) and
reference the cancel variable and Context passed into the handler.
Comment on lines
+58
to
+70
| go func() { | ||
| c.Next() | ||
| close(finished) | ||
| }() | ||
|
|
||
| select { | ||
| case <-finished: | ||
| cancel() | ||
| case <-ctx.Done(): | ||
| // handler exceeded timeout — may have already written partial response | ||
| onTimeout(c) | ||
| cancel() | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Critical: Data race between handler goroutine and timeout path.
Running c.Next() in a goroutine while the main goroutine may call onTimeout(c) creates unsynchronized concurrent access to c.index, c.handlers, and c.Writer. The Context struct's mutex only protects the Keys map (see context.go:61-79), not the index or response writer fields.
When the timeout fires while the handler is still executing:
c.Next()incrementsc.indexand readsc.handlers[c.index]onTimeoutcallsc.AbortWithStatus()which writesc.index = abortIndex- Both paths may call
c.Writer.Write()concurrently on unprotected fields
This will fail under go test -race.
Possible mitigation approaches
- Use a sync primitive to coordinate writes—e.g., a
sync.Onceor mutex guarding response writes - Use
http.TimeoutHandlerfrom the standard library, which wraps the response writer to prevent double-writes - Copy the pattern from gin-contrib/timeout which uses a buffered response writer that discards writes after timeout
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `@timeoutmiddleware.go` around lines 58 - 70, The handler goroutine and timeout
path currently access Context fields (c.index, c.handlers, c.Writer)
concurrently causing data races; fix by swapping c.Writer to a thread-safe
buffered/recording response writer before spawning the goroutine (see the
goroutine that calls c.Next()), ensure that the buffered writer
serializes/flashes or discards writes after timeout using a sync.Mutex and a
sync.Once (or an atomic flag) so concurrent calls from c.Next() and
onTimeout(c)/c.AbortWithStatus() cannot race on Write, and update onTimeout(c)
to interact only with the buffered writer (or use the same flush/abort API)
rather than directly touching c.index or the original Writer; follow the
gin-contrib/timeout pattern (buffered response writer + single flush/abort) to
eliminate unsynchronized access to c.index, c.handlers and c.Writer.
![cubic-dev-ai[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/1082092?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
There was a problem hiding this comment.
12 issues found across 6 files
Prompt for AI agents (unresolved issues)
Check if these issues are valid — if so, understand the root cause of each and fix them. If appropriate, use sub-agents to investigate and fix each issue separately.
<file name="recoveryjson.go">
<violation number="1" location="recoveryjson.go:55">
P2: Missing broken pipe handling that the existing `Recovery` middleware provides. When the panic value wraps `EPIPE`, `ECONNRESET`, or `ErrAbortHandler`, the connection is dead and `c.JSON(…)` will fail. Check for broken pipe before writing, mirroring `recovery.go` lines 63–84.</violation>
<violation number="2" location="recoveryjson.go:73">
P1: **Missing `c.Writer.Written()` guard before writing JSON response.** If a handler already wrote a partial response before panicking, calling `c.JSON` here writes a second response to an already-started body, corrupting the HTTP stream. The built-in `recovery.go` handles this; this middleware should too.</violation>
</file>
<file name="recoveryjson_test.go">
<violation number="1" location="recoveryjson_test.go:59">
P2: This test claims to cover `IncludeStack` but never asserts the `"stack"` key is present in the response body — the unmarshaled `body` is discarded with `_ = body`. Add an assertion so the feature is actually exercised.</violation>
</file>
<file name="timeoutmiddleware_test.go">
<violation number="1" location="timeoutmiddleware_test.go:50">
P2: Flaky test: the comment acknowledges a double-write race between the handler goroutine (writing 200) and the timeout handler (writing 503), but the assertion still expects exactly 503. Under `-race` this is an unsynchronized concurrent write to `httptest.ResponseRecorder`. The handler should detect context cancellation and return early, or the test should not assert a specific code.</violation>
<violation number="2" location="timeoutmiddleware_test.go:72">
P2: Data race on `ctxCancelled`: it is written in the handler goroutine and read on the test goroutine after `ServeHTTP` returns, with no synchronization. This will fail under `go test -race`. Use an `atomic.Bool` or a channel to communicate the value safely.</violation>
</file>
<file name="cors.go">
<violation number="1" location="cors.go:67">
P0: Security: `strings.Contains` for origin matching allows bypass via substring. An attacker-controlled origin like `evil-example.com` will match an allowed origin of `example.com`. Use exact string equality instead.</violation>
<violation number="2" location="cors.go:82">
P1: The CORS spec forbids `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` with `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` — browsers will reject the response. The struct comment documents this constraint but the code doesn't enforce it. Either skip setting the credentials header when `allowAll` is true, or validate the config upfront and return an error/panic.</violation>
<violation number="3" location="cors.go:96">
P0: Bug: `string(rune(cfg.MaxAge))` does not produce a numeric string — it interprets the integer as a Unicode codepoint. For `MaxAge=3600`, this emits the Thai character 'ฐ' (U+0E10) instead of `"3600"`. Use `strconv.Itoa(cfg.MaxAge)` (and add `"strconv"` to imports).</violation>
</file>
<file name="timeoutmiddleware.go">
<violation number="1" location="timeoutmiddleware.go:50">
P2: This comment is incorrect. `cancel()` is called in both branches of the `select` below (on both the `finished` and `ctx.Done()` paths), so the context is properly cancelled and no timer goroutine is leaked. The comment should either be removed or corrected to reflect the actual behavior.</violation>
<violation number="2" location="timeoutmiddleware.go:58">
P1: Data race: `c.Next()` runs in a goroutine but after the timeout fires, both the handler goroutine and `onTimeout(c)` can write to `c.Writer` concurrently. `gin.Context` and `responseWriter` have no synchronization protecting response writes. This will cause data races detectable with `-race`.
The ResponseWriter needs to be wrapped with a mutex-guarded implementation that blocks (or no-ops) writes from the handler once the timeout path takes over.</violation>
</file>
<file name="cors_test.go">
<violation number="1" location="cors_test.go:71">
P0: This test is a no-op: it never asserts anything, so it silently passes regardless of behavior. It should verify the header is absent — and doing so would reveal a **security bug** in the CORS middleware: `strings.Contains(origin, o)` in `cors.go:72` allows `https://evil-trusted.com` to bypass the origin allowlist because it's a substring match, not an exact match.
Replace the discarded value with an actual assertion, and fix the origin check in `cors.go` to use exact equality (`origin == o`) instead of `strings.Contains`.</violation>
<violation number="2" location="cors_test.go:105">
P1: This test never asserts the `Access-Control-Max-Age` value, hiding a bug in the implementation: `string(rune(3600))` converts the int to a Unicode code point (Thai character `ฐ`), not the string `"3600"`. The implementation should use `strconv.Itoa(cfg.MaxAge)`, and this test should assert the expected value.</violation>
</file>
Reply with feedback, questions, or to request a fix. Tag @cubic-dev-ai to re-run a review, or fix all with cubic.
| c.Header("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", expose) | ||
| } | ||
| if cfg.MaxAge > 0 { | ||
| c.Header("Access-Control-Max-Age", strings.Join([]string{string(rune(cfg.MaxAge))}, "")) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P0: Bug: string(rune(cfg.MaxAge)) does not produce a numeric string — it interprets the integer as a Unicode codepoint. For MaxAge=3600, this emits the Thai character 'ฐ' (U+0E10) instead of "3600". Use strconv.Itoa(cfg.MaxAge) (and add "strconv" to imports).
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At cors.go, line 96:
<comment>Bug: `string(rune(cfg.MaxAge))` does not produce a numeric string — it interprets the integer as a Unicode codepoint. For `MaxAge=3600`, this emits the Thai character 'ฐ' (U+0E10) instead of `"3600"`. Use `strconv.Itoa(cfg.MaxAge)` (and add `"strconv"` to imports).</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+ c.Header("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", expose)
+ }
+ if cfg.MaxAge > 0 {
+ c.Header("Access-Control-Max-Age", strings.Join([]string{string(rune(cfg.MaxAge))}, ""))
+ }
+
</file context>
| allowed := allowAll | ||
| if !allowed { | ||
| for _, o := range allowOrigins { | ||
| if strings.Contains(origin, o) { |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P0: Security: strings.Contains for origin matching allows bypass via substring. An attacker-controlled origin like evil-example.com will match an allowed origin of example.com. Use exact string equality instead.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At cors.go, line 67:
<comment>Security: `strings.Contains` for origin matching allows bypass via substring. An attacker-controlled origin like `evil-example.com` will match an allowed origin of `example.com`. Use exact string equality instead.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+ allowed := allowAll
+ if !allowed {
+ for _, o := range allowOrigins {
+ if strings.Contains(origin, o) {
+ allowed = true
+ break
</file context>
Suggested change
| if strings.Contains(origin, o) { | |
| if origin == o { |
| router.ServeHTTP(w, req) | ||
|
|
||
| // does not assert header is absent — substring bypass silently passes | ||
| _ = w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin") |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P0: This test is a no-op: it never asserts anything, so it silently passes regardless of behavior. It should verify the header is absent — and doing so would reveal a security bug in the CORS middleware: strings.Contains(origin, o) in cors.go:72 allows https://evil-trusted.com to bypass the origin allowlist because it's a substring match, not an exact match.
Replace the discarded value with an actual assertion, and fix the origin check in cors.go to use exact equality (origin == o) instead of strings.Contains.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At cors_test.go, line 71:
<comment>This test is a no-op: it never asserts anything, so it silently passes regardless of behavior. It should verify the header is absent — and doing so would reveal a **security bug** in the CORS middleware: `strings.Contains(origin, o)` in `cors.go:72` allows `https://evil-trusted.com` to bypass the origin allowlist because it's a substring match, not an exact match.
Replace the discarded value with an actual assertion, and fix the origin check in `cors.go` to use exact equality (`origin == o`) instead of `strings.Contains`.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+ router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+ // does not assert header is absent — substring bypass silently passes
+ _ = w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")
+}
+
</file context>
| // a partial response before panicking, calling c.JSON here | ||
| // writes a second response to an already-started body, | ||
| // corrupting the HTTP stream silently | ||
| c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, body) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P1: Missing c.Writer.Written() guard before writing JSON response. If a handler already wrote a partial response before panicking, calling c.JSON here writes a second response to an already-started body, corrupting the HTTP stream. The built-in recovery.go handles this; this middleware should too.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At recoveryjson.go, line 73:
<comment>**Missing `c.Writer.Written()` guard before writing JSON response.** If a handler already wrote a partial response before panicking, calling `c.JSON` here writes a second response to an already-started body, corrupting the HTTP stream. The built-in `recovery.go` handles this; this middleware should too.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+ // a partial response before panicking, calling c.JSON here
+ // writes a second response to an already-started body,
+ // corrupting the HTTP stream silently
+ c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, body)
+ c.Abort()
+
</file context>
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| if cfg.AllowCredentials { |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P1: The CORS spec forbids Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * — browsers will reject the response. The struct comment documents this constraint but the code doesn't enforce it. Either skip setting the credentials header when allowAll is true, or validate the config upfront and return an error/panic.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At cors.go, line 82:
<comment>The CORS spec forbids `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` with `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` — browsers will reject the response. The struct comment documents this constraint but the code doesn't enforce it. Either skip setting the credentials header when `allowAll` is true, or validate the config upfront and return an error/panic.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+ }
+ }
+
+ if cfg.AllowCredentials {
+ c.Header("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
+ }
</file context>
| var body map[string]any | ||
| require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &body)) | ||
| // does not assert stack field is present — IncludeStack behavior untested | ||
| _ = body |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P2: This test claims to cover IncludeStack but never asserts the "stack" key is present in the response body — the unmarshaled body is discarded with _ = body. Add an assertion so the feature is actually exercised.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At recoveryjson_test.go, line 59:
<comment>This test claims to cover `IncludeStack` but never asserts the `"stack"` key is present in the response body — the unmarshaled `body` is discarded with `_ = body`. Add an assertion so the feature is actually exercised.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+ var body map[string]any
+ require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &body))
+ // does not assert stack field is present — IncludeStack behavior untested
+ _ = body
+}
+
</file context>
Suggested change
| _ = body | |
| assert.NotEmpty(t, body["stack"], "expected stack trace in response when IncludeStack is true") |
|
|
||
| // race: handler goroutine may write 200 after timeout fires 503 | ||
| // test does not account for double-write scenario | ||
| assert.Equal(t, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, w.Code) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P2: Flaky test: the comment acknowledges a double-write race between the handler goroutine (writing 200) and the timeout handler (writing 503), but the assertion still expects exactly 503. Under -race this is an unsynchronized concurrent write to httptest.ResponseRecorder. The handler should detect context cancellation and return early, or the test should not assert a specific code.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At timeoutmiddleware_test.go, line 50:
<comment>Flaky test: the comment acknowledges a double-write race between the handler goroutine (writing 200) and the timeout handler (writing 503), but the assertion still expects exactly 503. Under `-race` this is an unsynchronized concurrent write to `httptest.ResponseRecorder`. The handler should detect context cancellation and return early, or the test should not assert a specific code.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+
+ // race: handler goroutine may write 200 after timeout fires 503
+ // test does not account for double-write scenario
+ assert.Equal(t, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, w.Code)
+}
+
</file context>
| } | ||
|
|
||
| func TestTimeout_ContextCancelledInsideHandler(t *testing.T) { | ||
| var ctxCancelled bool |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P2: Data race on ctxCancelled: it is written in the handler goroutine and read on the test goroutine after ServeHTTP returns, with no synchronization. This will fail under go test -race. Use an atomic.Bool or a channel to communicate the value safely.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At timeoutmiddleware_test.go, line 72:
<comment>Data race on `ctxCancelled`: it is written in the handler goroutine and read on the test goroutine after `ServeHTTP` returns, with no synchronization. This will fail under `go test -race`. Use an `atomic.Bool` or a channel to communicate the value safely.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+}
+
+func TestTimeout_ContextCancelledInsideHandler(t *testing.T) {
+ var ctxCancelled bool
+ router := New()
+ router.Use(Timeout(TimeoutConfig{Timeout: 50 * time.Millisecond}))
</file context>
|
|
||
| return func(c *Context) { | ||
| defer func() { | ||
| if rec := recover(); rec != nil { |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P2: Missing broken pipe handling that the existing Recovery middleware provides. When the panic value wraps EPIPE, ECONNRESET, or ErrAbortHandler, the connection is dead and c.JSON(…) will fail. Check for broken pipe before writing, mirroring recovery.go lines 63–84.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At recoveryjson.go, line 55:
<comment>Missing broken pipe handling that the existing `Recovery` middleware provides. When the panic value wraps `EPIPE`, `ECONNRESET`, or `ErrAbortHandler`, the connection is dead and `c.JSON(…)` will fail. Check for broken pipe before writing, mirroring `recovery.go` lines 63–84.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+
+ return func(c *Context) {
+ defer func() {
+ if rec := recover(); rec != nil {
+ stack := debug.Stack()
+
</file context>
|
|
||
| return func(c *Context) { | ||
| ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(c.Request.Context(), cfg.Timeout) | ||
| // cancel() not deferred here — only called on timeout path. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P2: This comment is incorrect. cancel() is called in both branches of the select below (on both the finished and ctx.Done() paths), so the context is properly cancelled and no timer goroutine is leaked. The comment should either be removed or corrected to reflect the actual behavior.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At timeoutmiddleware.go, line 50:
<comment>This comment is incorrect. `cancel()` is called in both branches of the `select` below (on both the `finished` and `ctx.Done()` paths), so the context is properly cancelled and no timer goroutine is leaked. The comment should either be removed or corrected to reflect the actual behavior.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+
+ return func(c *Context) {
+ ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(c.Request.Context(), cfg.Timeout)
+ // cancel() not deferred here — only called on timeout path.
+ // If the handler completes normally, the context is never cancelled,
+ // leaking the timer goroutine until it fires naturally.
</file context>
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Summary
JSONRecovery— recovers from panics and writes a structured JSON500response; companion to built-inRecovery()for APIs; supportsIncludeStack(dev mode) andOnPanichookTimeout— wraps handler in a context deadline; firesOnTimeout(default:503) when exceeded; allows handlers to detect cancellation viactx.Done()CORS— sets CORS response headers with configurableAllowOrigins,AllowMethods,AllowHeaders,ExposeHeaders,AllowCredentials, andMaxAge; handles preflightOPTIONSrequestsFiles
recoveryjson.gorecoveryjson_test.gotimeoutmiddleware.gotimeoutmiddleware_test.gocors.gocors_test.goTest plan
go build ./...passesgo test -run "TestJSONRecovery|TestTimeout|TestCORS" -v— all 15 tests passJSONRecoveryreturns JSON body on panic, text/plain body is not writtenTimeoutcancels slow handlers and returns 503CORSsetsAccess-Control-Allow-Originheader for allowed origins onlyCORSreturns 204 on OPTIONS preflight-raceto verify timeout goroutine safety🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Summary by cubic
Adds JSON panic recovery, per‑route timeout, and CORS middleware to the
ginrouter to improve API resilience and cross‑origin support (RAP‑436).JSONRecovery: returns structured JSON 500 on panics; optionalIncludeStackandOnPanichook.Timeout: cancels request context after a configurable duration; default 503 with customizableOnTimeout.CORS: configurableAllowOrigins,AllowMethods,AllowHeaders,ExposeHeaders,AllowCredentials,MaxAge; handles OPTIONS preflight.Written for commit e76dfd7. Summary will update on new commits.
Summary by CodeRabbit