feat(sec-core): change daemon from user to system service

[RemindD]

Why

What changed

• Build, launch and deliver v2 daemon service as a system service

Related issue

User / Agent impact

Risk and compatibility

• Public CLI, API, configuration, or documented behavior changed
• Privileged or security-sensitive behavior changed
• Cross-component contract changed
• Migration or rollback guidance is needed

Validation

Documentation and rollback

[chatgpt-codex-connector]

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Reviewed commit: c1f5e31e7f

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[kongche-jbw]

Review baseline: 628533bbb100ddf1f0e6db23a27115171f061367...d2c01616e312c844eac322f5575ace196208eace

[P1] Preserve privileged admission on the public socket

src/agent-sec-core/v2/crates/daemon/asc-daemon-service/src/server.rs:278
admits every peer against one global 64-connection semaphore before authorization. The daemon CLI
now publishes the socket as 0666, and each incomplete request retains a permit for five seconds.
Any local UID can therefore keep 64 partial connections open and make administrator requests hit
Busy indefinitely. Please keep the endpoint restricted until ingress isolation exists, or reserve
capacity by trusted peer identity. Add a cross-UID saturation test proving an administrator request
still completes while an ordinary UID holds its quota.

[P1] Update the public guides for the new service contract

src/agent-sec-core/README.md:37 still says the packaged daemon is a systemd user unit, while
docs/user-guide/en/agent-security/agent-sec-core/policy-cli.md:88 still marks --socket as
required; the Chinese mirrors have the same mismatches. The RPM now installs a system unit and both
binaries default to /run/agent-sec-core/daemon.sock, so users following the canonical install and
CLI docs get the wrong lifecycle and endpoint contract. Please update the paired README and
quick-start and Policy CLI pages with startup, authorization, upgrade/rollback, and socket-default
guidance, and
extend the documentation contract checks to lock these facts.

[P2] Isolate default-socket tests from the ambient environment

src/agent-sec-core/v2/apps/asc-cli/tests/commands.rs:300 and
src/agent-sec-core/v2/apps/asc-daemon/src/cli.rs:163 call the production parser and then assert
the hard-coded fallback without controlling AGENT_SEC_DAEMON_SOCKET. For example,
AGENT_SEC_DAEMON_SOCKET=/tmp/x cargo test default_socket_matches_the_system_service fails. This
makes the suite depend on the invoking shell or CI environment. Please inject the environment value
into a pure parser helper, and cover unset, empty, set, and explicit-argument precedence there.

[RemindD]

Review baseline: 628533bbb100ddf1f0e6db23a27115171f061367...d2c01616e312c844eac322f5575ace196208eace

[P1] Preserve privileged admission on the public socket

src/agent-sec-core/v2/crates/daemon/asc-daemon-service/src/server.rs:278 admits every peer against one global 64-connection semaphore before authorization. The daemon CLI now publishes the socket as 0666, and each incomplete request retains a permit for five seconds. Any local UID can therefore keep 64 partial connections open and make administrator requests hit Busy indefinitely. Please keep the endpoint restricted until ingress isolation exists, or reserve capacity by trusted peer identity. Add a cross-UID saturation test proving an administrator request still completes while an ordinary UID holds its quota.

[P1] Update the public guides for the new service contract

src/agent-sec-core/README.md:37 still says the packaged daemon is a systemd user unit, while docs/user-guide/en/agent-security/agent-sec-core/policy-cli.md:88 still marks --socket as required; the Chinese mirrors have the same mismatches. The RPM now installs a system unit and both binaries default to /run/agent-sec-core/daemon.sock, so users following the canonical install and CLI docs get the wrong lifecycle and endpoint contract. Please update the paired README and quick-start and Policy CLI pages with startup, authorization, upgrade/rollback, and socket-default guidance, and extend the documentation contract checks to lock these facts.

[P2] Isolate default-socket tests from the ambient environment

src/agent-sec-core/v2/apps/asc-cli/tests/commands.rs:300 and src/agent-sec-core/v2/apps/asc-daemon/src/cli.rs:163 call the production parser and then assert the hard-coded fallback without controlling AGENT_SEC_DAEMON_SOCKET. For example, AGENT_SEC_DAEMON_SOCKET=/tmp/x cargo test default_socket_matches_the_system_service fails. This makes the suite depend on the invoking shell or CI environment. Please inject the environment value into a pure parser helper, and cover unset, empty, set, and explicit-argument precedence there.

Preserve privileged admission on the public socket: TODO already added in previous PR
Update the public guides for the new service contract: v2 is not released yet so doc update is limited in v2 folder
Isolate default-socket tests from the ambient environment: fixed

[edonyzpc]

LGTM