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feat(read-file): record read scope and report clipping separately (U4, #1375) - #1913
easonLiangWorldedtech wants to merge 23 commits into
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📝 SummarySummary by CodeRabbit
WalkthroughThe change adds task-local file observations and read-completeness reporting. It adds staged text publication with backup handling, then updates ChangesFile read observations
Safe text and JSON writes
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Change: Feature Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant ReadFileTool
participant FileSystem
participant ObservationRegistry
ReadFileTool->>FileSystem: stat before read
ReadFileTool->>FileSystem: read file
ReadFileTool->>FileSystem: stat after read
ReadFileTool->>ObservationRegistry: record matching version token and completeness
sequenceDiagram
participant safeWriteJson
participant proper-lockfile
participant safeWriteText
participant FileSystem
safeWriteJson->>FileSystem: resolve lock key and publish target
safeWriteJson->>proper-lockfile: acquire lock
safeWriteJson->>safeWriteText: publish staged JSON with backup enabled
safeWriteText->>FileSystem: write, sync, and rename staged content
safeWriteJson->>proper-lockfile: release lock
Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The remaining concerns are a narrow write-failure edge case and a read-notice test gap. They do not establish a broad failure that blocks merging. Security Architecture ReviewSecurity architecture risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Read authorization remains intact, but JSON writes now follow file symlinks. A project configuration update can therefore modify configuration outside that project, including global tool-approval settings, when a workspace-controlled link points there. Retained concerns
Security review detailsSecurity Blast Radius
Security Findings and Attack Paths
Trust Boundaries and Controls
Resilience and Maintainability Implications
Hardening Proposals
Caution Pre-merge checks failedPlease resolve all errors before merging. Addressing warnings is optional.
❌ Failed checks (1 error, 2 warnings)
✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
Full details: Regression EvidenceExplanation The new confinement check has an uncovered boundary case. Resolution Add a focused Full details: Security BoundariesExplanation
Resolution Pass the canonical workspace directory as Full details: Lifecycle Resource CleanupExplanation The new backup lifecycle can leave persistent orphan files. ✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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…ve (U1, issue 1375) Split unit U1 of PR 1833. Three changes, each with a test that fails without it: - a caller-supplied staging path is checked for location and file type before anything is written, so an arbitrary path or a symlink cannot be published onto the target; - a failed parent-directory fsync on POSIX is reported as PostCommitDurabilityError instead of being swallowed, so a successful return never claims durability the filesystem did not grant; - the staged file and this write's own staging directory are released before RollbackFailureError is thrown. Focused coverage for resolveLockKey added: canonical parent directory, a dangling-link chain, and termination at the bounded depth on a two-link cycle.
Codecov Report❌ Patch coverage is
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@coderabbitai full review |
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…ishTarget (U1, issue 1375) The resolver may fall back to the given path only when lstat also reports the path as absent. An EACCES or EIO failure says nothing about whether the path is a link, so falling back would publish through a link we were not allowed to inspect. Focused tests added for both branches.
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… type-sound
compile failed at the unit head on three points:
- RollbackFailureError needs a string backupPath, but the throw now happens after cleanup, so the
`string | null` narrowing was lost. The failure is now held as { error, backupPath }.
- The async lstat stand-in is built on the Stats prototype so it satisfies fsSync.Stats.
- The realpath/readlink mocks are typed to the real signatures; the readlink mock answers once
because only the link path is read.
tsc clean, 50 tests pass, ESLint --max-warnings=0 clean, no suppression change.
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The any usage this entry covered is gone in the rewritten file, so the count drops 4 -> 3. eslint --prune-suppressions --max-warnings=0 confirms it.
The read tools record the observed on-disk version through task.observationRegistry, but the field was only declared in a later unit, so at this head the call dereferences undefined and the mocked e2e run fails on the read_file smoke tests. The registry is introduced by this unit, so the field belongs here. tsc clean on this unit, 11 observationRegistry tests pass, ESLint --max-warnings=0 clean.
The two any usages this entry covered are gone in the rewritten spec, so the count drops 98 -> 96. eslint --prune-suppressions --max-warnings=0 confirms it.
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Pre-merge review flagged that the write path trusts an unvalidated symlink target: safeWriteText resolves an existing link to its referent and safeWriteJson then merges and publishes onto that referent, so a repository that plants its project settings file as a link elsewhere receives the write at the linked path. safeWriteJson now accepts confineTo. The check runs on the resolved publish target, after resolvePublishTarget and before the merge read and before anything is staged, so a rejected write takes no lock and leaves no residue. Both sides are canonicalized the same way: the scope is resolved through symlinks (walking to the nearest existing ancestor when it does not exist yet, and rethrowing anything other than ENOENT), and the target is canonicalized with the same helper because a target that does not exist yet still carries the alias components of the path it was given. Callers that picked a path from a known scope pass that scope; a caller that does not declare one keeps the current behaviour. The MCP settings wiring that uses this is on the async-save series (Zoo-Code-Org#1403). Tests: an out-of-scope path is rejected on every platform with no lock and no staged file; a planted link escaping the project is rejected and the linked file keeps its bytes; a link inside the project still publishes to the referent; and a scope declared through a symlinked directory that does not exist yet is accepted.
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Both Pre-merge-check errors on this PR are addressed in the two new commits: Persistence Integrity — publication is no longer non-atomic when Security Boundaries — unvalidated symlink target ( Tests added/updated: a new Local: 84 passed / 4 skipped across safeWriteText.spec + integration spec + safeWriteJson + safeWriteJson.lockKey; @coderabbitai full review |
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Actionable comments posted: 2
- 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @src/core/tools/ReadFileTool.ts:
- Line 364: Add a test near the existing clipped-line coverage in
readFileTool.spec.ts for a clipped slice starting at line 1; assert the
full-read wording and the exact newline separator before result.content. Leave
the existing ReadFileTool logic and complete behavior unchanged.
Review comments at @src/services/file-safety/safeWriteText.ts:
- Around line 264-271: Update the staging and target `fs.lstat` calls in the
file identity check to request BigInt stats, then compare their `ino` and `dev`
values directly as BigInts. Preserve the existing handling when `targetStat` is
unavailable.
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📒 Files selected for processing (8)
src/core/tools/ReadFileTool.tssrc/core/tools/__tests__/readFileTool.spec.tssrc/services/file-safety/__tests__/safeWriteText.integration.spec.tssrc/services/file-safety/__tests__/safeWriteText.spec.tssrc/services/file-safety/safeWriteText.tssrc/utils/__tests__/safeWriteJson.lockKey.spec.tssrc/utils/__tests__/safeWriteJson.test.tssrc/utils/safeWriteJson.ts
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Check persistence and lifecycle invariants: awaited atomic writes, rollback or explicit partial-failure behavior, cross-window state consistency, stale listeners/watchers, cancellation, idempotency, and safe restart/resume without lost or d...
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src/services/file-safety/__tests__/safeWriteText.integration.spec.tssrc/services/file-safety/__tests__/safeWriteText.spec.tssrc/services/file-safety/safeWriteText.ts
Treat model, provider, MCP, path, command, and tool data as untrusted.
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src/core/tools/ReadFileTool.tssrc/core/tools/__tests__/readFileTool.spec.ts
Require regression coverage at the lowest valid harness with behavior-focused assertions, including relevant negative, error, false/unset, and boundary cases.
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src/services/file-safety/__tests__/safeWriteText.integration.spec.tssrc/utils/__tests__/safeWriteJson.lockKey.spec.tssrc/services/file-safety/__tests__/safeWriteText.spec.tssrc/core/tools/__tests__/readFileTool.spec.tssrc/utils/__tests__/safeWriteJson.test.ts
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src/services/file-safety/__tests__/safeWriteText.integration.spec.tssrc/utils/__tests__/safeWriteJson.lockKey.spec.tssrc/core/tools/ReadFileTool.tssrc/services/file-safety/__tests__/safeWriteText.spec.tssrc/core/tools/__tests__/readFileTool.spec.tssrc/utils/__tests__/safeWriteJson.test.tssrc/utils/safeWriteJson.tssrc/services/file-safety/safeWriteText.ts
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src/services/file-safety/__tests__/safeWriteText.integration.spec.tssrc/utils/__tests__/safeWriteJson.lockKey.spec.tssrc/core/tools/ReadFileTool.tssrc/services/file-safety/__tests__/safeWriteText.spec.tssrc/core/tools/__tests__/readFileTool.spec.tssrc/utils/__tests__/safeWriteJson.test.tssrc/utils/safeWriteJson.tssrc/services/file-safety/safeWriteText.ts
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src/services/file-safety/__tests__/safeWriteText.integration.spec.tssrc/utils/__tests__/safeWriteJson.lockKey.spec.tssrc/core/tools/ReadFileTool.tssrc/services/file-safety/__tests__/safeWriteText.spec.tssrc/core/tools/__tests__/readFileTool.spec.tssrc/utils/__tests__/safeWriteJson.test.tssrc/utils/safeWriteJson.tssrc/services/file-safety/safeWriteText.ts
🧠 Learnings (1)
📓 Common learnings
Learnt from: easonLiangWorldedtech
Repo: Zoo-Code-Org/Zoo-Code PR: 1913
File: src/services/file-safety/safeWriteText.ts:425-425
Timestamp: 2026-10-05T19:50:22.131Z
Learning: In src/services/file-safety/safeWriteText.ts, safeWriteText intentionally retains the backup when backup:true and the commit rename succeeds but parent-directory fsync fails with PostCommitDurabilityError. The backup remains available for recovery; it must not be deleted on this error path or renamed over the committed target. Staging-file and staging-directory cleanup still applies. Retention does not itself guarantee crash durability.
🪛 ast-grep (0.45.3)
src/services/file-safety/__tests__/safeWriteText.integration.spec.ts
[warning] 23-23: Filesystem path is not a string literal; a request-/variable-derived path can enable path traversal. Validate and normalize the path before use.
Context: fs.writeFile(targetPath, "old bytes")
Note: [CWE-22] Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').
(detect-non-literal-fs-filename-typescript)
[warning] 30-30: Filesystem path is not a string literal; a request-/variable-derived path can enable path traversal. Validate and normalize the path before use.
Context: fs.readFile(targetPath, "utf8")
Note: [CWE-22] Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').
(detect-non-literal-fs-filename-typescript)
[warning] 40-40: Filesystem path is not a string literal; a request-/variable-derived path can enable path traversal. Validate and normalize the path before use.
Context: fs.writeFile(inside, "original bytes")
Note: [CWE-22] Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').
(detect-non-literal-fs-filename-typescript)
[warning] 46-46: Filesystem path is not a string literal; a request-/variable-derived path can enable path traversal. Validate and normalize the path before use.
Context: fs.readFile(inside, "utf8")
Note: [CWE-22] Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').
(detect-non-literal-fs-filename-typescript)
🪛 GitHub Check: mutation-diff
src/core/tools/ReadFileTool.ts
[warning] 364-364: Mutation test advisory
src/core/tools/ReadFileTool.ts:364: 2 mutation test gaps; example: Survived ConditionalExpression mutant (replacement: false). See the job summary for the complete list and resolution guidance.
🔇 Additional comments (1)
src/core/tools/__tests__/readFileTool.spec.ts (1)
1938-1965: LGTM!
…ply-patch unit Brings this unit's file-safety core in line with Zoo-Code-Org#1910/Zoo-Code-Org#1912/Zoo-Code-Org#1913: - the backup is a copy, never a move, so the canonical path is present for the whole commit window. The destination is created with openSync(backupPath, "wx", 0o600) before any content exists at it (fs.copyFile otherwise picks the destination mode itself), chmod 0o600 after the copy clears a copied read-only attribute on Windows that would make the fsync open fail with EACCES, the copy is fsynced, and it is deleted once the commit rename publishes - nothing is ever renamed back; - safeWriteText rejects a staging file that is the target itself (same inode/device); - safeWriteJson accepts confineTo: the resolved publish target must sit inside the declared scope, checked before the lock and before anything is staged, with both sides canonicalized (scope through realpath, walking to the nearest existing ancestor when it does not exist yet and rethrowing anything but ENOENT). Tests: the copy-model safeWriteText spec plus a real-filesystem integration spec (no fs mocks); the safeWriteJson spec moves from the three-rename/rollback model to the copy model and gains four confinement cases; the lock-key spec accounts for the extra lstat the aliasing guard performs. 269 passed / 4 skipped across file-safety + safeWriteJson + lockKey + integrations/editor + guardedWrite; tsc and eslint clean, no suppression drift.
…ff-view unit Brings this unit's file-safety core in line with Zoo-Code-Org#1910/Zoo-Code-Org#1912/Zoo-Code-Org#1913/Zoo-Code-Org#1915: - the backup is a copy, never a move, so the canonical path stays present for the whole commit window. The destination is created with openSync(backupPath, "wx", 0o600) before any content exists at it (fs.copyFile otherwise picks the destination mode itself), chmod 0o600 after the copy clears a copied read-only attribute on Windows that would make the fsync open fail with EACCES, the copy is fsynced, and it is deleted once the commit rename publishes - nothing is ever renamed back; - safeWriteText rejects a staging file that is the target itself (same inode/device); - safeWriteJson accepts confineTo: the resolved publish target must sit inside the declared scope, checked before the lock and before anything is staged, with both sides canonicalized. Tests: the copy-model safeWriteText spec plus a real-filesystem integration spec; the safeWriteJson spec moves from the three-rename/rollback model to the copy model and gains four confinement cases; the lock-key spec accounts for the extra lstat the aliasing guard performs. 269 passed / 4 skipped across file-safety + safeWriteJson + lockKey + integrations/editor + guardedWrite; tsc clean (project-wide, no new errors), eslint clean, no suppression drift.
…sk-history unit Brings this unit's file-safety core in line with Zoo-Code-Org#1910/Zoo-Code-Org#1912/Zoo-Code-Org#1913/Zoo-Code-Org#1915/Zoo-Code-Org#1916: - the backup is a copy, never a move, so the canonical path stays present for the whole commit window; the destination is created with openSync(backupPath, "wx", 0o600) before fs.copyFile writes into it, chmod 0o600 clears a copied read-only attribute on Windows, the copy is fsynced, and it is deleted once the commit rename publishes - nothing is ever renamed back; - safeWriteText rejects a staging file that is the target itself (same inode/device); - safeWriteJson accepts confineTo: the resolved publish target must sit inside the declared scope, checked before the lock and before anything is staged, with both sides canonicalized. Tests: copy-model safeWriteText spec plus a real-filesystem integration spec; safeWriteJson spec moved off the three-rename/rollback model plus four confinement cases; lock-key spec accounts for the extra lstat. 269 passed / 4 skipped across file-safety + safeWriteJson + lockKey + integrations/editor + guardedWrite; project-wide tsc --noEmit clean; eslint clean, no suppression drift.
The staging-identity guard compared the caller-staged file with the target through fs.lstat(targetPath).catch(() => null). Any error other than ENOENT - EACCES, ENOTDIR, ELOOP - was therefore indistinguishable from "there is no target", so a staging path that is a hard link of the target would pass the identity check, reach the commit rename, and let the failure handler unlink the only copy of the content. Only ENOENT now yields "no target"; anything else fails closed with a StagingPathError before anything is opened, staged or renamed. Test: the staging path resolves to a hard link of the target (same ino/dev) and the target lstat rejects with EACCES; the write is rejected with the comparison error and neither openSync nor rename is called.
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Series alignment in 467cfda: the staging-identity guard no longer reads a failed target Regression test in Local: 85 passed / 4 skipped across @coderabbitai full review |
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The staging-identity guard read fs.Stats.ino/dev as JS numbers. On NTFS and ReFS those identifiers can exceed
Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER, and the rounding makes two different files look identical - a valid caller-staged file is
then rejected with StagingPathError (and a real alias could be missed). Both lstats now request { bigint: true } and
the comparison checks for bigint values before comparing them.
The spec stand-in carries bigint ino/dev, matching what lstat({ bigint: true }) returns at runtime (fs.BigIntStats is
a type-only export, so the double is documented at its single assertion).
The identity stand-in returns bigint identifiers regardless of the options, so the same-file tests could still pass if
either lstat dropped { bigint: true } - which is exactly the case that matters on NTFS/ReFS. Both tests now assert
that every identity lstat requested bigint stats.
The calls are filtered by their options rather than by path spelling: path.resolve prefixes a drive letter to
/tmp/... on Windows, so a path filter would only see one of the two reads on that platform.
…served On win32 the DACL of an existing target is saved before the commit rename so it can be reapplied afterwards. Two paths silently skipped that step and still published: - icacls /save failed (saved === false): the dump is cleaned up and the rename proceeds, so the new file inherits different access rights; - fs.access(targetPath) failed with something other than ENOENT (EACCES, ...): the catch treated "cannot check" as "target absent" and skipped DACL handling entirely. Both now report through a new onWarning sink (default console.warn): the write still proceeds - a missing or failing icacls must not leave the user unable to save, which is the documented fallback - but the caller is told the replacement may inherit different access rights instead of discovering it later. Tests: icacls save failure still commits the write and yields exactly one access-rights warning; an EACCES on the target yields the could-not-check warning and no icacls call. Verified as real regression tests - neutralizing the two warn calls makes both fail. 272 passed / 4 skipped locally; tsc and eslint clean.
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Series alignment in 1331a91: a win32 replacement whose DACL could not be saved (failed |
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✏️ Learnings added
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Split unit U4 of #1833, under the plan on this issue (5993969784 / 5994039786 / 5994053776). Base is U2 (#1912) per the merge order.
Scope (one gate scope): the read side — what a read records about its own scope, and reporting truncation and clipping as two separate notices.
Content source of record:
kind: commit, base7c291bb08→ head6768ccfaf, replayed on the current main tip9af61f87eso this branch carries nothing that main already has.Budget (own delta, not the stacked view): 932 a+d / 105 changed executable lines. Inside both caps.
Verification at this head: 94 passed (readFileTool) and 48 passed (indentation-reader); ESLint
--max-warnings=0clean on every file in the unit; Prettier clean;src/eslint-suppressions.jsonnever increased.The GitHub view also carries the unmerged base, so the numbers above are this unit's own delta.