fix(security): mobile select-all expansion and the Sentry tunnel SSRF

[DonKoko]

Two unrelated broken-access-control fixes from the detail.dev OSS scan, bundled
at the author's request so they land in one review cycle. They share no code —
read them as two PRs in one.

	Finding	Reachable by
1	Mobile endpoints expand the all-selected sentinel org-wide	SELF_SERVICE
2	Sentry tunnel is a full-read SSRF	any authenticated user

---

1 — Mobile select-all expansion (D130)

A SELF_SERVICE user could take custody of every available asset in the
workspace in a single mobile API call — and the same for kits.

Found by the detail.dev OSS scan (finding D130). Fourth of the select-all
cluster, after #2867 (tags), #2869 (locations) and #2872 (bookings).

The bug

The web list can send an all-selected sentinel instead of ids, meaning
"everything matching the filters I'm looking at". That contract works because
the web client also submits currentSearchParams, so the server rebuilds the
same filtered set.

Mobile has no select-all control and sends no filters — it hardcodes an empty
value:

assetIds: z.array(z.string().min(1)).min(1),   // accepts "all-selected"
…
currentSearchParams: "",                        // nothing to narrow by

So a sentinel reaching a mobile bulk endpoint expanded against an empty
filter — every matching row in the organization.

Who can reach it: bulk-assign-custody and bulk-release-custody require
asset:custody; the kit intents require kit:custody. SELF_SERVICE holds
both. So this is a restricted role acting workspace-wide, not an admin doing
something merely unbounded.

bulk-update-location needs asset:update, which restricted roles don't hold —
unbounded, but ADMIN/OWNER only.

Scope: the finding named one endpoint, there were seven sites

Endpoint	Sites	Reachable by
bulk-assign-custody	1	SELF_SERVICE
bulk-release-custody	1	SELF_SERVICE
bulk-update-location	1	ADMIN / OWNER
kits.bulk-actions	3 (assign / release / update-location)	SELF_SERVICE (custody intents)
custody.assign	1 — scalar assetId, wrapped as assetIds: [assetId]	SELF_SERVICE

The scalar one is the trap: ["all-selected"] satisfies
includes(ALL_SELECTED_KEY) exactly as a longer list does, so a single-asset
endpoint expands org-wide just as readily as a bulk one. It was found by
parameter.ai on this PR after the first six were fixed — a single-id field
simply does not read as a bulk operation. mobileIdSchema now guards that
shape beside mobileBulkIdsSchema.

I then swept every route funnelling an id into any of the 21 functions that
read ALL_SELECTED_KEY. This was the last one: custody.release and the
-quantity variants call singular services, and the remaining
assetIds: [id] call sites go to createNotes / getBookings, neither
sentinel-aware.

The fix

Reject the sentinel at the schema rather than teaching each service to cope.
A mobile client has no way to produce it legitimately — its presence means a
hand-crafted request.

assetIds: mobileBulkIdsSchema("assetIds"),

One shared helper covers all six sites, so a new mobile bulk endpoint can't
reintroduce this by copying a neighbour.

Why reject rather than support

Making mobile support select-all would mean forwarding real filters from the
client and trusting them — a much larger surface, for a feature the mobile UI
doesn't offer. Refusing is the smaller and more honest change.

Notes from verifying

The kit endpoints already carried comments acknowledging that mobile sends no
filters, and that the resolved set is therefore "every kit in the organization".
The release path had also gained an ownership guard from the earlier
2f20bbd85 fix. So the shape was known — what was missing is that the sentinel
should never have been accepted in the first place, which closes it for the
assign intent too, where no ownership guard applies.

Not a breaking change for the companion app

The obvious risk in rejecting an input is breaking a client that legitimately
sends it. Checked before and after writing the fix:

• No occurrence of all-selected or ALL_SELECTED anywhere in
  apps/companion/.
• No select-all control in the companion UI.
• Its API wrappers (lib/api/custody.ts, lib/api/kits.ts) take explicit
  assetIds: string[] / kitIds: string[] built from scanner selections.

So the sentinel cannot arise from the shipped app — only from a hand-crafted
request, which is exactly what this refuses. No companion release is needed.

Tests

• app/modules/api/mobile-bulk-ids.server.test.ts (7) — sentinel alone, sentinel
  mixed with real ids, empty list, the message naming its field, and that an id
  merely containing the string is still accepted.
• mobile.bulk-assign-custody.test.ts (+2) — end-to-end: a crafted select-all
  request is refused and bulkCheckOutAssets is never called.
• mobile.custody.assign.test.ts (+2) — the same, for the scalar field. Added
  to the existing suite; its two prior tests still pass unchanged.

Both route tests were confirmed to return 200 and reach the write with the
guard removed.

11 existing mobile bulk route tests still pass.

---

2 — Sentry tunnel SSRF (D071)

/api/sentry-tunnel built its upstream URL from the DSN inside the client's
own envelope, so the destination host was fully attacker-controlled, and it
returned the upstream response body to the caller. That is a full-read SSRF.

Found by the detail.dev OSS scan (finding D071).

The bug

const dsn = JSON.parse(header).dsn as string;   // from the request body
const url = new URL(dsn);
const sentryUrl = `https://${url.hostname}/api/${projectId}/envelope/`;

const sentryResponse = await fetch(sentryUrl, { method: "POST", … });
return new Response(sentryResponse.body, { status: sentryResponse.status, … });

The hardcoded https:// is not a defense

It only constrains the first hop, and the route set no redirect option, so
fetch follows redirects by default:

1. Attacker points the DSN at a public host they control.
2. That host answers with 302 → http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/….
3. fetch chases it — cross-protocol, into link-local space.
4. The body comes back through the tunnel to the attacker.

I verified this against real sockets before writing the fix, rather than
taking the report's word for it:

redirect followed to a DIFFERENT host:port : true
status returned to caller                  : 200
BODY returned to caller                    : "INTERNAL-SECRET-CREDENTIALS"
=> full-read SSRF: CONFIRMED

Who can reach it: any authenticated user — the route is behind the session
middleware but has no further gate. See the D053 note at the bottom.

The fix

Stop deriving the destination from input at all.

The server already knows the only Sentry project it may talk to — its own
SENTRY_DSN. So the envelope's DSN is now only compared against that, and
the URL we fetch is built entirely from server-side config:

const target = getConfiguredSentryTarget();          // from SENTRY_DSN
if (!target) return 404;                             // nothing legitimate to proxy to
if (!envelopeDsnMatches(dsn, target)) return 403;    // compared, never interpolated
await fetch(buildSentryEnvelopeUrl(target), { …, redirect: "manual" });

Fails closed throughout: an unparseable DSN yields null, and an unset
SENTRY_DSN refuses to proxy rather than falling back to the envelope's value —
that fallback is the bug.

Why not safeFetch?

The repo already has an SSRF guard (~/utils/ssrf.server, from
GHSA-xgrm-8w6v-mvjg). It is the wrong tool here on both counts:

• It is GET-only and returns a buffer — shaped for image downloads, not an
  envelope POST.
• More importantly it blocks private/reserved addresses but still permits any
  globally-routable host. That is the right boundary for user-supplied image
  URLs, where arbitrary public hosts are the feature. Here they are not — leaving
  it as an open relay that POSTs attacker bytes from our IP.

One legitimate destination means an allow-list of one beats filtering the
internet. redirect: "manual" then closes the redirect leg as defense in depth.

Comparison is on parsed components, never substrings

Host matching by startsWith/endsWith/includes is bypassable from both
ends, so the check compares URL components. Covered by tests:

Attack	Why a naive check fails
evil-o123.ingest.sentry.io	ends with ours
o123.ingest.sentry.io.evil.com	contains ours
https://o123.ingest.sentry.io@evil.com/	ours is userinfo; the host is evil.com
same host, project 999	a free relay into any other Sentry org

Self-hosted deployments

The destination is now the full origin (scheme + host + port) plus the
base path the instance is mounted under. An earlier revision of this PR stored
hostname and the last path segment only, which was still wrong for a
self-hosted Sentry: https://key@sentry.example.com:8443/sentry/456 would have
forwarded to https://sentry.example.com/api/456/envelope/.

To be precise about what is and isn't a regression — the port was dropped by
the pre-fix code too (it also read hostname), and the prefix was mishandled
differently there (pathname.replace("/", "") strips only the first slash,
so it produced /api/sentry/456/envelope/). Neither version produced the right
URL; this one does. Shelf Cloud is root-mounted on the default port, so this
never surfaced in production.

Caught by CodeRabbit — thanks.

Sweep

Per the house rule that this class travels in packs, I grepped for other
server-side fetch calls with an interpolated host. This was the only one —
the CSV imageUrl path already goes through safeFetch.

Tests

• app/utils/sentry-tunnel.server.test.ts (22) — DSN parsing and the
  host/project comparison, including every look-alike above.
• test/routes-tests/api+/sentry-tunnel.test.ts (12) — end-to-end.

The route tests assert on the URL passed to fetch, because that is the
sink. A test that only checked the response status would pass while the request
still went to the attacker's host.

All 8 security assertions were confirmed to fail against the pre-fix route
and pass after — verified by restoring the old file, not by assumption.

Follow-ups (not in this PR)

• D053 — the tunnel is missing from publicPaths, so anonymous client
  errors are 302'd to /login and lost. That fix is now safe to make; doing it
  before this one would have converted an authenticated SSRF into an
  unauthenticated one.
• Before D053 lands, consider whether an unauthenticated tunnel wants a body-size
  cap. I deliberately left one out here: Sentry envelopes carrying replays or
  large stack traces can be big, and guessing a limit risks silently dropping
  legitimate error reports — a regression that would be invisible.

Summary by CodeRabbit

• Bug Fixes

  • Mobile bulk actions now reject empty IDs and select-all sentinel values with clear HTTP 400 validation errors.
  • Malformed mobile requests are handled safely without exposing generic server errors.
  • Sentry tunnel requests are restricted to the configured HTTPS destination, blocking unauthorized or attacker-controlled endpoints.
  • Missing or mismatched Sentry configuration now returns appropriate client errors.

• Tests

  • Added regression coverage for mobile ID validation and Sentry tunnel security, including malformed inputs, alternate destinations, and redirect prevention.

[github-actions]

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✅ No new findings on the files changed by this PR.

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Walkthrough

Added shared mobile ID schemas and updated mobile routes to reject select-all sentinels and malformed bodies. Hardened the Sentry tunnel by pinning forwarding to the configured DSN and validating envelope DSNs.

Changes

Mobile ID validation

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Shared mobile-ID schemas apps/webapp/app/modules/api/mobile-bulk-ids.server.ts, apps/webapp/app/modules/api/mobile-bulk-ids.server.test.ts	Added bulk and scalar schemas. Tests cover valid IDs, empty values, sentinel values, field-specific errors, and valid sentinel substrings.
Asset bulk route validation apps/webapp/app/routes/api+/mobile+/bulk-assign-custody.ts, apps/webapp/app/routes/api+/mobile+/bulk-release-custody.ts, apps/webapp/app/routes/api+/mobile+/bulk-update-location.ts, apps/webapp/test/routes-tests/api+/mobile.bulk-assign-custody.test.ts	Updated bulk asset routes to safely parse bodies and return uncaptured 400 ShelfError responses for malformed bodies or invalid asset IDs.
Scalar asset route validation apps/webapp/app/routes/api+/mobile+/custody.assign.ts, apps/webapp/test/routes-tests/api+/mobile.custody.assign.test.ts	Updated scalar asset validation to use mobileIdSchema. Tests reject sentinel and empty asset IDs before custody execution.
Kit bulk route validation apps/webapp/app/routes/api+/mobile+/kits.bulk-actions.ts	Replaced inline kit-ID validation with the shared schema and explicit 400 error handling.

Sentry tunnel hardening

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Configured Sentry target validation apps/webapp/app/utils/sentry-tunnel.server.ts, apps/webapp/app/utils/sentry-tunnel.server.test.ts	Added strict HTTPS DSN parsing, configured-target lookup, host and project matching, and configured envelope URL construction.
Pinned Sentry forwarding apps/webapp/app/routes/api+/sentry-tunnel.ts, apps/webapp/test/routes-tests/api+/sentry-tunnel.test.ts	The tunnel returns 404 without configuration, returns 403 for mismatched DSNs, forwards only to the configured target, and disables redirects. Tests cover rejected destinations and forwarding behavior.

Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes

Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to 3131f

The PR narrows mobile bulk selection and pins Sentry forwarding to the server-configured destination, but it is not merge-ready yet because malformed keyless or nonnumeric DSNs still need to be rejected and the required checks have not completed. These bounded security and readiness issues should be resolved or explicitly accepted before merge.

Sequence Diagram(s)

sequenceDiagram
  participant Client
  participant MobileRoute
  participant IDSchema
  participant OperationService
  Client->>MobileRoute: Send mobile JSON request
  MobileRoute->>IDSchema: Safely validate assetId, assetIds, or kitIds
  IDSchema-->>MobileRoute: Return validation result
  alt Valid IDs
    MobileRoute->>OperationService: Execute mobile operation
    OperationService-->>MobileRoute: Return operation result
  else Invalid body or sentinel
    MobileRoute-->>Client: Return HTTP 400 ShelfError
  end

Loading

sequenceDiagram
  participant Client
  participant SentryTunnel
  participant ConfiguredTarget
  participant Sentry
  Client->>SentryTunnel: Submit envelope with DSN
  SentryTunnel->>ConfiguredTarget: Resolve configured SENTRY_DSN
  SentryTunnel->>SentryTunnel: Compare envelope DSN
  alt Matching configured target
    SentryTunnel->>Sentry: Forward to configured HTTPS endpoint
    Sentry-->>SentryTunnel: Return response
    SentryTunnel-->>Client: Return response
  else Missing or mismatched target
    SentryTunnel-->>Client: Return HTTP 404 or 403
  end

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🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5

✅ Passed checks (5 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Description Check	✅ Passed	Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly summarizes both main security fixes: mobile select-all expansion and the Sentry tunnel SSRF.
Docstring Coverage	✅ Passed	Docstring coverage is 100.00% which is sufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%.
Linked Issues check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.

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[parameterai]

Warning

Finding on apps/webapp/app/routes/api+/mobile+/custody.assign.ts:45 — could not attach an inline comment (line is not part of the diff), so reporting it here.

Mobile custody.assign: single assetId field can carry the ALL_SELECTED_KEY sentinel, assigning custody of every asset in the org

POST /api/mobile/custody/assign validates assetId as any non-empty string (z.string().min(1)), then immediately wraps it: assetIds: [assetId]. When assetId === "all-selected" that becomes ["all-selected"], which is exactly the ALL_SELECTED_KEY sentinel. bulkCheckOutAssets → resolveAssetIdsForBulkOperation detects it via assetIds.includes(ALL_SELECTED_KEY) and, because currentSearchParams is hardcoded to "" (falsy), calls getAssetsWhereInput which returns early at if (!currentSearchParams) { return where; } with only { organizationId } — i.e. every asset in the workspace. A SELF_SERVICE user (who holds asset:custody) can therefore send {"assetId":"all-selected","custodianId":"<their own team-member id>"} and take custody of every available asset in the organization in one request. This is the same bug class the PR is patching in the bulk endpoints but was missed in the single-asset endpoint.

Prompt To Fix With AI

In `custody.assign.ts`, the `assetId` field must be rejected when it equals `ALL_SELECTED_KEY` (`"all-selected"`). Apply one of these fixes:

Option A — add a Zod `.refine` on the field:
```ts
import { ALL_SELECTED_KEY } from "~/utils/list";

const { assetId, custodianId } = z
  .object({
    assetId: z
      .string()
      .min(1)
      .refine((id) => id !== ALL_SELECTED_KEY, {
        message: 'assetId must be an explicit asset id, not the "select all" sentinel.',
      }),
    custodianId: z.string().min(1),
  })
  .parse(body);
```

Option B — import and use the new `mobileBulkIdsSchema` helper (wrapping in an array, then extracting) is awkward here; the refine approach is cleaner for a scalar field.

Also consider adding a similar guard in `custody.release.ts` if it accepts an `assetId` string that flows into a sentinel-aware service.

---

_{Severity: high | Confidence: 90% | React with 👍 if useful or 👎 if not}

Fixed in 193d3c8a.

[DonKoko]

Confirmed and fixed in 193d3c8a8. Good catch — this is a genuine seventh site, and the reason it was missed is exactly the one you name: a single-id field does not read as a bulk operation.

Verified the chain rather than taking it on faith: assetIds: [assetId] → bulkCheckOutAssets → resolveAssetIdsForBulkOperation, whose check is assetIds.includes(ALL_SELECTED_KEY). A one-element array satisfies that exactly as a longer one does, and currentSearchParams: "" is hardcoded two lines below, so getAssetsWhereInput returns early with only { organizationId }. SELF_SERVICE holds asset:custody, so this was reachable by a restricted role.

I went with a shared helper rather than an inline .refine, so the scalar shape is guarded in the same place as the array one and the next mobile endpoint can't reintroduce it by copying a neighbour:

// ~/modules/api/mobile-bulk-ids.server
export function mobileIdSchema(field: string) { … }   // scalar
export function mobileBulkIdsSchema(field: string) { … }  // array

The route also moves to safeParse → non-captured 400, matching the bulk siblings after an earlier Codex finding on this PR.

On your custody.release.ts suggestion — checked, and it does not need the guard. It calls the singular releaseCustody, not a sentinel-aware service, so there is no expansion path. Same for custody.assign-quantity and custody.release-quantity.

Rather than fix just the reported line, I swept every route that funnels an id into any of the 21 functions that read ALL_SELECTED_KEY. custody.assign was the only remaining one; the other assetIds: [id] call sites in the codebase go to createNotes or getBookings, neither of which reads the sentinel.

Regression coverage added to the existing mobile.custody.assign.test.ts suite, asserting the 400 and that bulkCheckOutAssets is never called — confirmed failing against the pre-fix schema.

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Actionable comments posted: 1

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Inline comments:
In `@apps/webapp/test/routes-tests/api`+/mobile.custody.assign.test.ts:
- Around line 178-182: Update the regression test in the select-all sentinel
case to import and use the production ALL_SELECTED_KEY constant for assetId
instead of the hardcoded "all-selected" value, keeping the test synchronized
with the production contract.

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Inline comments:
In `@apps/webapp/app/utils/sentry-tunnel.server.ts`:
- Around line 35-40: Extend SentryIngestTarget and parseSentryDsn to retain the
DSN origin, including its port, and the configured path prefix alongside
projectId. Update buildSentryEnvelopeUrl to construct the endpoint from both
retained values, and update envelopeDsnMatches to compare both origin and
prefix. Add a forwarding test covering a prefixed DSN on a non-default port.

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Inline comments:
In `@apps/webapp/app/utils/sentry-tunnel.server.test.ts`:
- Around line 30-58: Create a valid DSN test-data factory with realistic
defaults, then update the positive parseSentryDsn tests to use it with only
scenario-specific overrides for origin, port, base path, and projectId. Keep
malformed DSN values literal in negative tests where necessary, and avoid
hardcoded valid DSNs in the test cases.

In `@apps/webapp/app/utils/sentry-tunnel.server.ts`:
- Around line 35-52: Add a JSDoc block immediately before the exported
SentryIngestTarget type to document the purpose and role of the ingest target;
retain the existing field-level comments unchanged.
- Around line 100-104: Update the DSN validation before returning the target to
require a nonempty url.username and ensure projectId is numeric; return null for
keyless or nonnumeric DSNs. Add regression tests covering both invalid cases
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