fix: prevent command injection in npm_update_latest_prefect workflow #19554
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Use environment variables instead of direct expression interpolation
for workflow inputs in shell commands. Direct use of ${{ inputs.* }}
in run scripts can allow command injection if input values contain
shell metacharacters. Moving inputs to env variables ensures they
are treated as string values by the shell.
ColeMurray
requested review from
chrisguidry,
cicdw,
desertaxle and
zzstoatzz
as code owners
Contributor
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Summary
Context
The
npm_update_latest_prefect.yamlworkflow was using${{ inputs.package_name }}and${{ inputs.package_version }}directly in shellruncommands. This pattern can allow command injection because the expressions are interpolated before the shell executes, meaning special characters in the inputs could be interpreted as shell commands.This change moves the inputs to environment variables, which are safely handled as string values by the shell.