fix: harden rewrite and file handling edge cases#6
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| fn ensure_existing_regular_file(path: &Path, operation: &str) -> io::Result<()> { | ||
| let metadata = fs::symlink_metadata(path)?; | ||
| let metadata = fs::metadata(path)?; |
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Switching this check to fs::metadata makes safe_fs::read_to_string follow symlinks, so symlink paths now pass the regular-file guard. I checked src/session/persistence.rs, and session_file_path() falls back to /tmp/whispers/session.json when XDG_RUNTIME_DIR is unset; a precreated symlink there can redirect reads to attacker-chosen regular files, causing session-load DoS or parsing attacker-controlled JSON that was previously blocked by symlink rejection. Keeping symlink-safe read validation (symlink_metadata and nofollow semantics) avoids this /tmp symlink attack surface.
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Summary
Testing
cargo fmt --all -- --checkcargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warningscargo testcargo test structured_text -- --nocapturecargo test build_rewrite_plan -- --nocapturecargo test safe_fs -- --nocapturecargo test runtime_diagnostics -- --nocapturecargo check --no-default-featurescargo check --no-default-features --features osdcargo check --no-default-features --features local-rewritecargo check --no-default-features --features cudacargo check --no-default-features --features cuda,local-rewritecargo package --lockedcargo install --path . --features cuda --force