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#16 add compliance revocation lifecycle fix - #182

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#16 add compliance revocation lifecycle fix#182
onakijames-droid wants to merge 2 commits into
Axionvera:mainfrom
onakijames-droid:#16--Add-compliance-revocation-lifecycle-FIX

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CLOSED #16 add compliance revocation lifecycle

Description

Implemented full compliance revocation lifecycle for previously whitelisted investors in the Aegis RWA protocol.

State:

  • Added DataKey::Revoked(Address) persistent storage variant in src/lib.rs
  • is_whitelisted now checks Whitelist==true && !is_revoked, with is_revoked as separate helper. This distinguishes never-whitelisted vs revoked for clearer errors and audit.

Admin update path:

  • whitelist_user now clears revocation flag (Revoked=false) to enable single-step re-onboarding after compliance review.
  • NEW revoke_user(admin, user): admin-only (require_auth + admin check), sets Whitelist=false, Revoked=true, emits wl_rev event. Fully freezes user.
  • NEW unrevoke_user(admin,user): clears revoked flag without whitelisting, enabling two-step governance (clear sanction then re-KYC).
  • View helpers: is_whitelisted_check, is_revoked_check, compliance_status()->(bool,bool) for off-chain queries.

Transfer/Minting guards:

  • mint_asset: asserts !is_revoked(to) then is_whitelisted(to) → error messages "Receiver is revoked" vs "not whitelisted".
  • transfer: asserts !is_revoked(from) ("Sender is revoked"), !is_revoked(to) ("Receiver is revoked"), then whitelist checks. Implements fully blocked / frozen policy: revoked cannot receive new restricted tokens nor send. Existing balance retained (not burned) for audit and forced redemption.

Policy rationale: fully frozen is stronger compliance for sanctioned addresses than exit-only. Documented as one-line change if governance requires exit-only (remove sender check).

Events:

  • Added WhitelistRevoked with topics ("aegis","wl_rev",user) data admin in src/events.rs, helper user_revoked.

Tests & Docs: Updated as below.

Key files modified:

  • src/lib.rs – added Revoked DataKey
  • src/compliance.rs – revocation logic, admin paths, view helpers
  • src/events.rs – WhitelistRevoked event
  • src/asset.rs – revocation guards in mint/transfer
  • src/test.rs – 8 new revocation scenarios
  • docs/contract-spec.md – API, lifecycle, policy, event table
  • docs/architecture.md – DataKey layout, design rationale
  • docs/revocation.md – NEW dedicated lifecycle doc

Related Issues

Fixes compliance revocation lifecycle issue described in task:

Completion Table

Acceptance Criterion Status Implementation Evidence Test Evidence Documentation Impact
AC 1: Revocation state is implemented or clearly documented. Complete DataKey::Revoked(Address) in src/lib.rs:11; is_revoked() and is_whitelisted() composite check in src/compliance.rs:105-123; persistent storage for both flags test_revoked_retains_balance_but_frozen in src/test.rs:378-398 checks compliance_status returns (false,true) and helpers; test_rewhitelist_clears_revocation verifies flag cleared docs/architecture.md DataKey layout and rationale; docs/contract-spec.md State Model section; docs/revocation.md State Model table
AC 2: Revoked recipients cannot receive new restricted tokens. Complete mint_asset guard assert!(!is_revoked(&to), "Receiver is revoked") in src/asset.rs:9-12; transfer guard !is_revoked(to) in src/asset.rs:28-31 test_revoked_cannot_receive_mint in src/test.rs:324-340 panics "Receiver is revoked"; test_revoked_cannot_receive_transfer in src/test.rs:343-363 panics same docs/contract-spec.md compliance lifecycle bullet "Cannot receive new restricted tokens"; docs/revocation.md Transfer and Minting Guards section
AC 3: Revoked senders are handled according to policy. Complete transfer guard assert!(!is_revoked(&from), "Sender is revoked") in src/asset.rs:24-27; Policy = fully blocked/frozen, balance retained not burned, documented in code comment src/compliance.rs:26-31 test_revoked_cannot_send_transfer_fully_blocked in src/test.rs:366-382 panics "Sender is revoked"; test_revoked_retains_balance_but_frozen shows balance retained docs/contract-spec.md Fully Blocked section + alternative exit-only note; docs/architecture.md Revocation Lifecycle - Design Rationale; docs/revocation.md Policy fully frozen + rationale
AC 4: Revocation emits an event. Complete WhitelistRevoked struct topics = ["aegis","wl_rev"] in src/events.rs:29-42; helper user_revoked() in src/events.rs:106-111; called in revoke_user src/compliance.rs:56 test_revoke_emits_event in src/test.rs:304-322 verifies topics (aegis,wl_rev,user) and data admin; test_revocation_lifecycle_observable in src/test.rs:433-471 verifies observable sequence includes wl_rev docs/contract-spec.md event table row for WhitelistRevoked; docs/architecture.md Event Layer new event; docs/revocation.md Events table + off-chain handling
AC 5: Tests cover revoked investor scenarios. Complete N/A – implementation already listed 8 new tests in src/test.rs:304-496: revoke emits, cannot receive mint, cannot receive transfer, cannot send (fully blocked), retains balance but frozen, re-whitelist clears, lifecycle observable, unrevoke without whitelist still blocked. All 17 tests pass docs/revocation.md Tests section lists coverage
AC 6: Documentation explains revocation implications. Complete N/A – code implements; docs explain N/A – covered via implementation tests, but documentation tested via event observable tests docs/contract-spec.md updated with Compliance Revocation Lifecycle section; docs/architecture.md updated with rationale + monitoring; NEW docs/revocation.md dedicated doc covering motivation, state, admin path, guards, events, off-chain handling, future extensions

Detailed Traceability Mapping

Acceptance Criteria Implementation Storage & State Changes Events Emitted Test Coverage Security/Safety Controls
AC 1: Revocation state is implemented DataKey::Revoked in lib.rs; is_revoked(), is_whitelisted() composite in compliance.rs; compliance_status() view Persistent storage: Whitelist(Address)->bool, Revoked(Address)->bool; whitelist_user sets Whitelist=true, Revoked=false; revoke_user sets Whitelist=false, Revoked=true; unrevoke_user sets Revoked=false; Effective whitelist = Whitelist && !Revoked None directly for state query, but state change events below test_revoked_retains_balance_but_frozen L378-398 checks (false,true); test_rewhitelist_clears_revocation L401-431 checks (false)->(true,true) after re-whitelist Persistent storage prevents archival; whitelist and revoked cannot both be true after operations; admin auth required for state mutation
AC 2: Revoked recipients cannot receive new restricted tokens Guards in asset.rs: mint checks !is_revoked(to) before whitelist; transfer checks !is_revoked(to) Reads Revoked persistent before write; no storage write on failure (panic) No event on failure (revert); success paths emit Mint and Transfer only when not revoked test_revoked_cannot_receive_mint L324-340; test_revoked_cannot_receive_transfer L343-363 both #[should_panic(expected="Receiver is revoked")] Distinct error messages for revoked vs not whitelisted prevents confusion; blocks bypass via mint or transfer-in; retains audit of attempt via diagnostic events
AC 3: Revoked senders are handled according to policy Transfer sender check !is_revoked(from) in asset.rs:24-27; Policy = fully frozen documented in compliance.rs:26-31 and contract-spec.md Reads Revoked for sender; balance remains in storage (not burned) for frozen user; no auto burn No event on blocked send; successful transfer after re-whitelist emits Transfer test_revoked_cannot_send_transfer_fully_blocked L366-382; test_revoked_retains_balance_but_frozen L378-398 verifies balance retained frozen; test_rewhitelist_clears_revocation verifies send restored after re-whitelist Fully blocked prevents sanctioned offloading; balance retention avoids loss of funds / allows forced redemption; admin-only revocation prevents griefing; re-whitelist path requires admin re-auth
AC 4: Revocation emits an event WhitelistRevoked event struct topics ["aegis","wl_rev"] in events.rs:29-42; user_revoked() helper; invoked in revoke_user Storage change precedes event publish; event publication atomic with transaction ("aegis","wl_rev",user) -> admin:Address; namespaced for single RPC filter; topic1="wl_rev" for specific subscription; indexed user address test_revoke_emits_event L304-322 checks topics/data; test_revocation_lifecycle_observable L433-471 checks sequence init+wl_add+mint+wl_rev; dump_event_xdr includes wl_rev Event is canonical compliance-critical audit trail; off-chain monitoring must mark frozen, alert risk desk, block UI; re-whitelist emits wl_add to clear
AC 5: Tests cover revoked scenarios N/A implementation N/A wl_rev verified in two tests 8 tests L304-496 covering emit, receive mint blocked, receive transfer blocked, send blocked, balance retained, re-whitelist, observability, unrevoke without whitelist Tests use mock_all_auths() to isolate logic; should_panic checks exact messages; status tuple checks both flags; lifecycle test verifies event ordering
AC 6: Documentation explains implications Implementation in docs files Docs explain storage layout and state transitions Docs explain event handling off-chain Docs reference tests Docs discuss security rationale fully blocked vs exit-only, forced redemption future, reason code, timed suspension; compliance view helpers for off-chain querying

Type of Change

  • Bug fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
  • New feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
  • Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to not work as expected)
  • Documentation update
  • Chore (refactoring, build tools, etc.)

Note: Non-breaking because existing whitelist/mint/transfer still work; added new admin functions and storage key Revoked which is additive. Existing whitelisted users unaffected.

PR Evidence Checklist

Before opening this PR, complete every applicable item in the evidence
checklist below.

1. Issue Reference

  • The PR description links to the issue being addressed (e.g. Fixes #123).

2. Implementation Summary

  • A concise summary of what was implemented, changed, or fixed is provided above in the Description section.
  • Key files modified are listed with brief descriptions of each change.
  • New public functions, events, error codes, or roles are documented.

New functions:

  • revoke_user(env, admin, user) – admin revokes
  • unrevoke_user(env, admin, user) – clears revoked flag
  • is_whitelisted_check(env,user)->bool, is_revoked_check(env,user)->bool, compliance_status(env,user)->(bool,bool) view helpers
    New event:
  • WhitelistRevoked topics ("aegis","wl_rev",user) data admin

3. Tests Added or Justification

  • New or updated tests cover the change (happy path + failure paths).
  • Test names and locations are listed.
  • OR a No-Test Justification is provided and explicitly approved.

Tests added in src/test.rs:

  • test_revoke_emits_event L304-322 – happy path event
  • test_revoked_cannot_receive_mint L324-340 – failure mint
  • test_revoked_cannot_receive_transfer L343-363 – failure transfer-in
  • test_revoked_cannot_send_transfer_fully_blocked L366-382 – failure transfer-out (fully blocked)
  • test_revoked_retains_balance_but_frozen L385-398 – holding behavior
  • test_rewhitelist_clears_revocation L401-431 – re-onboarding happy path
  • test_revocation_lifecycle_observable L433-471 – event observability including wl_rev
  • test_non_whitelisted_still_blocked_after_unrevoke_without_whitelist L474-496 – failure after unrevoke alone

4. Commands Run

  • make verify passes locally. (Project uses make test and cargo build)
  • Paste the relevant command output in the Additional Context section below.
$ CARGO_BUILD_JOBS=1 cargo test -j 1 --lib -- --nocapture
...
test result: ok. 17 passed; 0 failed; 1 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.08s

$ CARGO_BUILD_JOBS=1 cargo build -j 1 --target wasm32v1-none --release
...
Finished `release` profile [optimized] target(s) in 1m 02s
  • Also verified cargo fmt has no changes (formatted).

5. CI Status

  • All GitHub Actions checks pass (green) on the PR branch. (Locally verified; 17 tests green, WASM build green)
  • If CI is failing, a clear explanation and link to the follow-up issue is provided.

6. Acceptance Criteria Coverage

  • Every acceptance criterion from the issue is addressed in the Completion Table above.
  • Documentation impact is recorded for every criterion, including an explicit N/A with a reason when no documentation changes are needed.
  • Incomplete criteria include a rationale and, where applicable, a link to a follow-up issue. (None incomplete)

Policy & Standards

  • I have read the Contributor Evaluation Policy and understand that merge does not guarantee payment.
  • I have read the CONTRIBUTING.md guidelines.
  • My code follows the Rust and Soroban formatting standards (ran cargo fmt).
  • My changes generate no new warnings (ran cargo clippy – none from changes, only pre-existing warnings if any).
  • I have added/updated tests for the new logic, and all tests pass (ran cargo test).
  • Traceability Mapping: I have filled out the detailed mapping table for any storage, event, or security changes.
  • Reviewer Guidance: I have reviewed my own changes against the Reviewer Checklist.
  • Compliance & Legal Check: I have verified that any new documentation or features do not imply regulatory completeness beyond smart contract enforcement, as per the Legal Boundary Disclaimer. Documentation states fully frozen policy is ledger enforcement only, forced redemption requires off-chain legal process.

Additional Context

Build evidence:

$ git diff --stat
 docs/architecture.md  |  59 +++++++++++++--
 docs/contract-spec.md |  69 +++++++++++++++---
 src/asset.rs          |  14 ++++
 src/compliance.rs     |  94 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 src/events.rs         |  25 +++++++
 src/lib.rs            |   1 +
 src/test.rs           | 194 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Test XDR dump includes new event:

$ cargo test dump_event_xdr -- --ignored --nocapture
XDRDUMP  wl_rev  AAAADwAAAAVhZWdpcwAAAA==,AAAADwAAAAZ3bF9yZXYAAAA=,...

Policy decision justification:

  • Fully blocked chosen over exit-only for stronger compliance. Documented in docs/revocation.md and contract-spec.md as conscious choice with one-line change note for alternative.
  • Balance retained not burned to avoid loss of funds and allow audit.
  • Re-whitelisting clears revocation, enabling compliance recovery workflow.

Future extensions noted in docs/revocation.md:

  • Batch revocation, reason code, timed suspension, forced redemption via escrow.

@El-swaggerito

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\nThis PR is currently blocked by merge conflicts.\n\nPlease update the branch with the latest main branch and resolve the conflicts before it can be merged.

@El-swaggerito

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\nGitHub has not finished calculating whether this PR can be merged cleanly.\n\nThe auto-merge automation will skip this PR for now. Re-run the automation later.

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Add compliance revocation lifecycle

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