diff --git a/src/replication/gossip.rs b/src/replication/gossip.rs
index c6344d0..05910b2 100644
--- a/src/replication/gossip.rs
+++ b/src/replication/gossip.rs
@@ -127,10 +127,16 @@ impl GossipMessage {
 /// under `max_bytes` when wrapped in a `DeltaBatch`. Chunks are greedily
 /// filled: each delta is serialized, its cost measured, and if adding it to
 /// the current chunk would exceed `max_bytes` the chunk is sealed and a new
-/// one started. A single oversized delta (rare — larger than `max_bytes` on
-/// its own) is placed into its own chunk; the receiver will still reject it,
-/// but the sender produces a clean signal instead of silently accumulating
-/// messages that can never fit.
+/// one started.
+///
+/// A single oversized delta (larger than `max_bytes` on its own — typically a
+/// very large LPUSH/XADD payload, HSET against a huge hash, or long list/set)
+/// cannot be split at the gossip level because we would violate CRDT delta
+/// semantics. Such a delta is placed into its own chunk and a WARN is emitted
+/// with the key and serialized size so operators can trace the offending
+/// client. The resulting message will still exceed the receiver's 1 MiB cap
+/// and be rejected, but the sender produces a diagnostic signal instead of
+/// silently accumulating un-deliverable state.
 ///
 /// ## Invariants
 /// - Every returned chunk is non-empty.
@@ -164,6 +170,21 @@ fn split_deltas_into_chunks(
             .map(|v| v.len().saturating_add(1))
             .unwrap_or(256);
 
+        // A single delta that's already over the chunk cap cannot be split
+        // at this layer — log the key + size so operators can trace the
+        // offending client. The downstream message will exceed the 1 MiB
+        // receiver cap and be dropped on the wire, but we prefer a loud
+        // signal over silent accumulation.
+        if delta_bytes > max_bytes {
+            warn!(
+                key = %delta.key,
+                delta_bytes,
+                max_bytes,
+                "Oversized replication delta exceeds gossip chunk cap; receiver will \
+                 reject. Check client for unusually large values (LPUSH/XADD/HSET)."
+            );
+        }
+
         let projected = current_bytes.saturating_add(delta_bytes);
         if projected > max_bytes && !current.is_empty() {
             chunks.push(std::mem::take(&mut current));
@@ -722,6 +743,53 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Diagnostic: measure actual post-chunking serialized message sizes for
+    /// realistic large-value scenarios. Captures the size statistics to help
+    /// validate (or invalidate) the chunking boundary.
+    #[test]
+    fn diag_many_medium_deltas_post_chunking_size_under_cap() {
+        // 100 deltas, each ~15 KB (realistic for medium values)
+        let deltas: Vec<_> = (0..100)
+            .map(|i| make_delta_approx_bytes(i, 15_000))
+            .collect();
+        let chunks = split_deltas_into_chunks(deltas, MAX_GOSSIP_PAYLOAD_BYTES);
+        for (idx, chunk) in chunks.iter().enumerate() {
+            let msg = GossipMessage::new_delta_batch(ReplicaId::new(1), chunk.clone(), 0);
+            let size = msg.serialize().unwrap().len();
+            assert!(
+                size <= 1_048_576,
+                "Chunk {} with {} medium deltas serialized to {} bytes, exceeds 1 MiB",
+                idx,
+                chunk.len(),
+                size
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Diagnostic: a SINGLE delta larger than the chunk cap must be detectable —
+    /// my chunking places it in its own chunk (can't split one delta), but the
+    /// resulting serialized message will exceed the 1 MiB receiver cap and be
+    /// silently dropped on the wire. This test documents that behavior and
+    /// serves as a guard for future fixes that may need to split at the
+    /// value level or drop oversized deltas with a WARN.
+    #[test]
+    fn diag_single_oversized_delta_produces_oversized_message() {
+        // A single delta with a 1.5 MB value — plausible for a large LPUSH
+        let huge = make_delta_approx_bytes(0, 1_500_000);
+        let chunks = split_deltas_into_chunks(vec![huge], MAX_GOSSIP_PAYLOAD_BYTES);
+        assert_eq!(chunks.len(), 1, "One oversized delta produces one chunk");
+        assert_eq!(chunks[0].len(), 1);
+        let msg = GossipMessage::new_delta_batch(ReplicaId::new(1), chunks[0].clone(), 0);
+        let size = msg.serialize().unwrap().len();
+        // This is the failure mode: chunking did its best, but the receiver
+        // will still reject a single-delta message over the cap.
+        assert!(
+            size > 1_048_576,
+            "Oversized single delta must produce an oversize message (got {size}) — \
+             this is the bug PR #24 addresses by logging a diagnostic"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_queue_deltas_splits_in_broadcast_fallback() {
         // Without a router configured, queue_deltas falls back to broadcast